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ABSTRACT 
Is China trying to build a “String of Pearls” in the Indian Ocean? My hypothesis is that 
China is not looking to build large overseas military bases in the Indian Ocean. With the 
revolution in military affairs and improvements in C4ISR over the last twenty years, 
international military bases are no longer as critical to intelligence collection and force 
projection as they were during the 20th century. This reduces the necessity of overseas 
bases to primarily serve as logistics hubs—which can be contracted out to host countries 
and reduce/eliminate the need to establish large overseas military bases.   
 This thesis attempts to prove this hypothesis by examining improvements in 
military capabilities that include satellites, open source intelligence, cyberspace, and 
unmanned vehicles. With these improvements established, this thesis examines three 
comparative case studies involving states that have decided to reduce their international 
maritime presence over the last twenty years. Finally, Chinese perceptions and behaviors 
are examined to determine whether China is operating according to a post-Mahan 
international force projection theory. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Is China trying to build a “string of pearls” in the Indian Ocean? Although there 
have been many different variations on the concept of “string of pearls,” according to the 
original Energy Futures of Asia report, it is defined as developing “strategic relationships 
along the sealanes from the Middle East to the South China Sea in ways that suggest 
defensive and offensive positioning, not only to protect its energy interests, but also to 
serve broader security objectives”1 (see Figure 1). Such strategic relationships include 
building both commercial and military facilities. According to Energy Futures of Asia, 
“China is financing and building a civilian and naval port in Gwadar, Pakistan… China is 
building a container port facility in the old Bangladesh port of Chittagong, and China 
may be seeking much more extensive naval and commercial access to Bangladesh.”2  
The critical issue is trying to understand the Chinese intentions in the Indian Ocean. 
On one hand, the improvements in intelligence collection and dissemination over 
the last twenty years mean large international military bases are no longer as critical to 
force projection and intelligence collection as they were during the 20th century. This 
reduces the function of overseas bases to primarily serve as logistics hubs—which can be 
contracted out to host countries and reduce/eliminate the need for China to establish a 
large overseas military presence in the Indian Ocean. Thus, my question: Does China 
believe it needs to build a series of overseas military bases in order to accomplish its 
strategic national and international objectives?  Or, is it possible that military technology 
today, and China in particular, might be operating on different international force 
projection theories and strategies than the Mahan model. Alfred Thayer Mahan, a United 
States naval officer, developed the Mahan model at the end of the 19th century. His most  
 
 
                                                 
1 Juli A. MacDonald, Amy Donahue, and Bethany Danyluk, Energy Futures in Asia (Washington, DC: 
Booz Allen Hamilton, Nov. 2004), iii. 
2 MacDonald, Donahue, and Danyluk, Energy Futures in Asia, 15. 
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important work, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783 (1890), discussed 
how in order for a state to become powerful it had to control the sea and trade through sea 
power.  
 
Figure 1.   String of Pearls3  
B. IMPORTANCE   
My research purpose here is to reexamine China’s strategy, which is often 
understood as creating a string of pearls in the Indian Ocean. Most analyses of Chinese 
objectives in the international maritime environment are based on the ideas and theories 
that the United States, Soviet Union, and other Great Powers used during the 20th 
century. In the maritime realm, many of these theories were based on the work of A. T. 
Mahan, who argued for an expansive overseas presence in order to secure and control 
trade routes.4  Another reason for the development of overseas bases was as a catalyst for 
colonialism.5 In order to accomplish these objectives, it meant building a military 
                                                 
3 MacDonald, Donahue, and Danyluk, Energy Futures in Asia, 17. 
4 A.T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660–1783 (Cambridge: University Press, 
1987).  
5 Bernard Brodie, Sea Power in the Machine Age (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944). 
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network of bases throughout a country’s maritime trading region. Some policy makers 
continue to rely on this theory and similar theories of force projection to determine 
China’s objectives:  
The growing dependence on long-haul sealanes and offshore energy 
resources mean that energy strategies increasingly will have a defensive 
military component, particularly with a naval focus…If competition for 
energy resources increases, states will likely develop offensive 
components to their energy strategies, with the intent of targeting other’s 
countries energy security.6  
Other advocates of this viewpoint are James Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara. In 
their book, Chinese Naval Strategy in the 21st Century: The Turn to Mahan, the authors 
assess that China will use Mahan as a central pillar in their maritime expansion: “This 
study contends that Alfred Thayer Mahan’s writings and theories on sea power furnish an 
indispensable framework for understanding China’ emerging maritime strategy.”7 
With the revolution in military affairs (RMA) and subsequent advances in 
technology, however, is it possible that China might be operating on international force 
projection theories and strategies that are different from the Mahan model?  If this were 
the case, it would mean that policymakers would need to factor in a new theoretical 
framework to determine future Chinese international actions, and create policy and plans 
that reflect this theory. The focus in this thesis is to help provide a different framework 
that could be used to explain current policy questions related to China’s activities in the 
Indian Ocean and evaluate Chinese actions to see if they are consistent with this. For 
example, why has China not continued to militarize its joint port facility in Gwadar, 
Pakistan, and what are China’s intentions in building a port in Chittagong?8  How can we 
explain this within the larger context of strategy? Such explorations are necessary for the 
U.S. forcing policy as it confronts new post-cold-war realities.  
 
                                                 
6 MacDonald, Donahue, and Danyluk, Energy Futures in Asia, 26. 
7 James R. Holmes, Toshi Yoshihara, Chinese Naval Strategy in the 21st Century (New York: 
Routledge, 2008), 5. 
8 “Is Chittagong one of China’s ‘string of pearls’?” BBC News, May 17, 2010, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/8687917.stm 
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C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
There are two main elements in my argument. First, I show that China is not 
engaging in policy, as the string of pearls strategy would predict. This is relatively easily 
done. Second, I explain why that is not the case. I lay out hypotheses for this and examine 
related cases and Chinese perceptions of their own strategic situation. While several 
previous articles have challenged the string of pearls theory of Chinese international 
maritime expansion, this thesis offers an explanation of why China might consider large 
international military bases less efficient than other methods of achieving their political, 
economic, and military objectives. The most important issues that are raised here are why 
China’s international behavior does not parallel that postulated in the string of pearls 
theory concerning China’s expansion in the Indian Ocean?  Based on this variation from 
the predicted behavior, does this mean that the string of pearls theory is flawed, based on 
faulty assumptions, and/or maybe outdated? If so, is there another framework to examine 
and explain Chinese international maritime behavior and provide a better tool for 
prediction in the future? 
 My hypothesis is that the improvements in C4ISR over the last twenty years 
means international military bases are no longer as critical to force projection as they 
were during the 20th century, and that this in turn explains China’s strategic behavior. 
This reduces the necessity of overseas bases to primarily serve as logistics hubs—which 
can be contracted out to host countries and reduce/eliminate the need to establish large 
overseas military bases.   
 International military bases were necessary for three key military reasons: 
reducing uncertainty (intelligence), force projection (rapid reinforcements), and logistics. 
In “Chinese Overseas Basing Requirements for the 21st Century,” Christopher Yung 
offers a similar list of reasons for why some Chinese military individuals advocate for 
overseas bases.9  These include: (1) logistics, (2) uphold international law, (3) maintain 
its role in the international arena, and (4) protect Chinese shipping lanes. Items 2, 3, and 4 
require military force, and military force requires intelligence.   
                                                 
9 Christopher D. Yung, “Chinese Overseas Basing Requirements for the Twenty First Century,” 
National Defense University (Apr. 2012), 3. 
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In examining these three reasons more in-depth:    
—Reducing uncertainty: With improvements in intelligence collection and 
dissemination intelligence collection can be done from a country’s home territory with 
the same level of clarity that once required large, intelligence-gathering, overseas 
operations (cyber reconnaissance, satellites, and unmanned vehicles). 
—Force Projection: Countries always seek to maximize the effect of their 
reinforcements by positioning them in areas of the higher threat, thus giving them the 
shortest response time. With advances in military intelligence and technology these 
forces can be deployed to high threat areas quicker since they will have more warning 
than in the 20th century (cyber-attacks, unmanned vehicles, better indications and 
warning). 
—Logistics: In the 20th century, countries had to rely on their own overseas 
military bases to ensure that vital supplies would always be available. These supplies 
ranged from military supplies like shells and bullets to more mundane items like food and 
water. This was especially important because in various areas of the world there were no 
friendly or stable governments available to assist military or civilian vessels. Since the 
end of the 20th century, the international maritime arena has changed. Many countries are 
now more stable and available to assist with basic logistics provided financial 
compensation is offered. Logistics can be contracted to foreign countries to ensure 
supplies are readily available for military sea and air forces; however, since these are 
primarily resupply areas, there is no need for a significant military presence. An example 
of this logistics hub concept would be the 1990 Memorandum of Understanding between 
the United States and Singapore regarding the use of facilities in Singapore. During the 
1990s, the United States typically stationed around 150 military and civilian members in 
Singapore. Today, “COMLOG WESTPAC has approximately 90 military and civilians 
assigned and is the largest command in Singapore.”10 Even with this small military 
presence, however, the facilities at Singapore support a large number of United States 
naval and air force units: 
                                                 
10 United States Navy, “Singapore Welcome Abroad Packet,” 
http://www.clwp.navy.mil/Welcome%20Aboard.pdf. 
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Bilateral military access agreements allow the United States to operate 
resupply vessels from Singapore and to use a naval base, a ship repair 
facility, and an airfield on the island-state. The U.S. Navy also maintains a 
logistical command unit—Commander, Logistics Group Western 
Pacific—in Singapore, which serves to coordinate warship deployment 
and logistics in the region. As part of the agreements, squadrons of U.S. 
fighter planes are rotated to Singapore for a month at a time, and naval 
vessels make regular port calls. Changi Naval Base is the only facility in 
Southeast Asia that can dock a U.S. aircraft carrier. 11  
This logistics hub concept allows the issue of logistics to be addressed without 
having to establish overseas military bases. At the same time, intelligence and military 
force projection can be accomplished in new ways that do not require overseas military 
bases. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Overall, the literature concerning the concept of the string of pearls and the future 
development of Chinese maritime power projection can be divided into two broad 
groups. The first group of literature looks at the rise of China and its increasing military 
power and assesses that China is laying the groundwork towards a future of international 
military bases similar to the United States in the second half of the 20th century. The 
second group of literature looks at the rise of China and assesses that China will continue 
to develop maritime military capabilities for limited force projection, but that this will not 
involve creating overseas military bases. However, there is a gap in the literature relating 
to the strategic philosophy of why China would not build a string of pearls. My thesis 
attempts to fill this critical gap in strategic philosophy by explaining why China will not 
build international military bases as part of a string of pearls.   
Previous articles in the second group of literature mainly cite China’s lack of 
capability and resources to adequately expand and defend military bases in the Indian 
Ocean. They do not focus on the idea that with the revolution in military affairs the 
reasons for overseas military bases might have become outdated. Are modern overseas 
military bases an outdated military concept? If so, has China recognized this and decided 
                                                 
11 Emma Chanlett-Avery, “Singapore: Background and U.S. Relations,” Congressional Research 
Service (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 2011), 5. 
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not to build them?  My thesis develops this strategic shift in military thought to add to, 
and possibly explain the reasons why China is not and will not develop overseas military 
bases. 
The current debate about a string of pearls [SOP] centers on the question of 
Chinese military intentions. As the Quadrennial Defense Review Report in 2010 stated, 
“China has shared only limited information about the pace, scope, and ultimate aims of 
its military modernization programs, raising a number of legitimate questions regarding 
its long term intentions.”12 The first group of literature examines this military data and 
assesses that China will develop international military bases for a variety of reasons 
including force projection, resource security, and national prestige. The primary 
advocates for this viewpoint is a report by Booz Allen Hamilton entitled Energy Futures 
of Asia, prepared for the Department of Defense in 2004.13  This is the first time the 
phrase string of pearls was used, and it encapsulated a trend of different academic and 
journalist viewpoints that saw the rise of China’s economy and military modernization as 
a first step towards greater regional ambition. Noted pundit and strategic commentator 
Robert Kaplan also supports this viewpoint, noting that the ports China is establishing in 
the Indian Ocean will be converted to military bases:  
The Chinese government has already adopted a ‘string of pearls’ strategy 
for the Indian Ocean, which consists of setting up a series of ports in 
friendly countries along the ocean’s northern seaboard. It is building a 
large naval base and listening post in Gwadar, Pakistan.14 
Kaplan has also stated that the reason China wants to resolve the Taiwan dispute 
is to shift its focus towards the Indian Ocean. Some publications state that China has 
developed 12 so-called “pearl” facilities so far.15  Supporters of the SOP theory often 
point to statements made by some Chinese military members as evidence to support their 
                                                 
12 Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, DC: Feb. 2010), 31. 
13 MacDonald, Donahue, and Danyluk, Energy Futures in Asia. 
14 Robert D. Kaplan, “Center Stage for the Twenty-first Century: Power Plays in the Indian Ocean,” 
Foreign Affairs (Mar.-Apr. 2009). http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64832/robert-d-kaplan/center-
stage-for-the-21st-century. 
15 Christian Bedford, “The View from the West: String of Pearls: China’s Maritime Strategy in India’s 
Backyard,” Canadian Naval Review 4, no. 4 (Winter 2009), 37. 
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theory: “Zhao Nanqi, former director of the General Logistics Department of the People’s 
Liberation Army, proclaimed in 1993, ‘We can no longer accept the Indian Ocean as an 
ocean only of the Indians.’”16  This narrative is also adopted by some journalists as a way 
to frame any Chinese activity in the Indian Ocean. Examples include the Washington 
Times,17 the BBC,18 and some defense journals.19 Additionally, recommendations for 
United States policy have been based on this theory of Chinese expansion into the Indian 
Ocean for concepts as different as strategic engagement20 to increasing United States Air 
Force counter-sea capability.21  
Other journalists and academics also expand the SOP theory and link it to a 
broader conspiracy:  
China and Iran are constructing a series of strategically placed harbors—
their strings of salt water pearls—partially for independent strategic 
reasons but equally to ensure maritime commerce in oil, gas, other licit 
resources, and illicit technologies between both nations can continue 
uninterrupted.22 
 In his book, The Great Wall at Sea Bernard, Cole does not explicitly use the term 
string of pearls, but offers a rationale and evidence that supports the general theory:  
China’s maritime strategy is linked inextricably to continued economic 
growth in the twenty-first century, which in turn depends on reliable 
foreign sources of energy.… Chinese military personnel have been 
 
 
                                                 
16 Kaplan, “Center Stage for the Twenty-first Century: Power Plays in the Indian Ocean.”  
17 “China Builds Up Strategic Sea Lanes,” Washington Times, Jan. 17, 2005, 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2005/jan/17/20050117–115550–1929r/. 
18 “Pakistan Launches Strategic Port,” BBC News, Mar. 20, 2007, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6469725.stm. 
19 David Eshel, “2011 Flashpoints: Asia,” Defense Update, Dec. 20, 2012, http://www.defense-
update.com/analysis/2010/20122010_analysis_string_of_pearls.html. 
20 Christopher J. Pehrson, “String of Pearls: Meeting the Challenge of China’s Rising Power Across 
the Asian Littoral,” Master’s Thesis, Air University, 2006.  
21 Lawrence Spinetta, “The Malacca Dilemma – Countering China’s ‘String of Pearls’ with Land-
Based Airpower,” Master’s Thesis, Air University, 2006, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA476931. 




reported in Burma, building and improving maritime facilities…reports of 
Chinese activities at what may be electronic monitoring facilities on the 
Cocos and Hangyi Islands.23  
Cole also embeds the concept of an expansionist Chinese navy in a recent 
historical context,  
The PLAN offers China’s leaders a flexible, ready instrument for applying 
power, and Beijing has not hesitated to use it: witness the 1974, 1988, 
1995, and 1998–99 actions in the South China Sea and the 2008–2010 
operations in the Gulf of Aden. Offshore defense is a maritime strategy 
with clear offensive implications.24   
However, Cole assesses that before China can significantly expand into the Indian Ocean, 
some limitations concerning distance and logistics need to be resolved: “A more 
ambitious goal is defense to the energy-rich Southwest Asian and East African littorals. 
The PLAN does not possess the platforms or experience to defend these SLOCs, which 
stretch more than 5,000 nm.”25  This suggests that Cole agrees with the foundational 
logic of the Booz Allen study, but assesses that China will first need significant time to 
develop its maritime capability before being able to accomplish this objective.    
The second group of literature looks at the rise of China and its increasing 
military power, and assesses that China will continue to develop maritime military 
capabilities for limited force projection, but that this will not involve creating overseas 
military bases. Daniel Kostecka for instance, cites the lack of concrete evidence 
illustrating China’s attempting to build military bases in the Indian Ocean, “Despite the 
furor it has generated, the string of pearls does not represent a coordinated strategy on the 
part of China, and there is no substantive evidence in Chinese sources or elsewhere to 
support the contentions of commentators.”26  In another article, he examines the lack of 
military progress at Gwadar, Pakistan, and concludes, “China will not pursue further 
                                                 
23 Bernard D. Cole, The Great Wall at Sea (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2010), 181. 
24 Cole, The Great Wall at Sea, 183. 
25 Cole, The Great Wall at Sea, 156. 
26 Daniel L. Kostecka, “Places and Bases,” Naval War College Review 64 (2011): 61. 
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involvement in Gwadar.”27  Other academics also point to how complicated it would be 
to convert commercial ports into naval bases: “Even if China’s leaders were 
contemplating militarizing these ‘pearls,’ there are serious doubts about the feasibility of 
such a scheme.”28  Journalist accounts in the last few years have begun to question 
whether a string of pearls is more illusion than reality. Examples include Asia Times 
reporting on the dilapidate state of the port at Gwadar29 or China’s intensions in the 
Seychelles.30  Other authors examine Chinese soft power and make a counter-intuitive 
argument that as China becomes more powerful, it will have less necessity for military 
expansion. Instead it will be able to rely on its increased diplomatic and economic power 
to achieve its objectives.31 
This second group of literature is less developed than the first group of literature. 
The reason for this is that it has taken a few years to determine what would occur in areas 
where China was investing, such as Gwadar. Only recently has evidence indicated that 
the theoretical conversion of these areas to military bases has not occurred.   
The goal of my thesis is to advance a different strategic perspective about why 
China does not need a string of pearls. Currently, most anti-string of pearls arguments 
revolve around a lack of Chinese capabilities, but they do not address a potential shift in 
Chinese strategic military thinking. My thesis illustrates that the Chinese are no longer 
using the strategic perspective offered by Mahan. Instead, the Chinese military has 
developed a new military power projection strategy based on the new capabilities that 
have emerged from the revolution in military affairs, and this new strategy has made 
large, overseas military bases obsolete.  
I accomplish this by examining advances in the following areas: satellite imagery, 
open source intelligence, unmanned vehicles, and cyber capabilities. Many authors have 
                                                 
27 Daniel L. Kostecka, “A Bogus String of Pearls,” Proceedings 137 (Apr. 2011): 48–52. 
28 Ashley S. Townshend, “Unraveling China’s ‘String of Pearls,” Yale Global Online (Sept. 2011). 
29 Peter Lee, “China Drops the Gwadar Hot Potato,” Asia Times, May 28, 2011. 
30 Maseeh Rahman, “Chinese plans in Seychelles revive Indian fears of encirclement,” The Guardian, 
Mar. 22, 2012. 
31 Fravel, M. Taylor. “Power Shifts and Escalation: Explaining China’s Use of Force in Territorial 
Disputes,” International Security 32 no. 3 (2008): 44–83. 
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examined these advances and linked their conclusions to how this could affect future 
tactical military capability. In The U.S. Intelligence Community, author Jeffrey Richelson 
covers the advances in commercial satellite imagery and open source intelligence to 
describe how this has advanced intelligence collection to a new level.32  In Wired for 
War, P. W. Singer examines the role that unmanned vehicles have come to play in war.33  
In Cyber War, Richard Clarke discusses how cyber can now perform many objectives 
that previously required a kinetic attack—and that cyber can “end the conflict before it 
begins.”34  There is a gap, however, in the literature that links these advancements to 
changes in a country’s international military posture and foreign policy. These case 
studies are used to demonstrate how these advancements have led to international force 
reduction for the United States, Britain, and Israel during the last twenty years. This 
thesis concludes by assessing Chinese perceptions about the utility of overseas bases and 
their perceptions of force projection in the 21st century  
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
In order to answer my research question—Are modern overseas military bases an 
outdated military concept? If so, has China recognized this and decided not to build 
them?  I will use a methodology that involves an analysis of comparative case studies and 
direct evaluation of Chinese expressed perceptions and behaviors. The three comparative 
case studies will involve states that decided to reduce their international military presence 
during the last twenty years. The reason these states reduced their international presence 
will be illustrated as a reaction to the technological advances of the revolution in military 
affairs and the corresponding understanding that military capability is measured 
differently, “in terms of capabilities rather than numbers.”35  These three case studies are: 
the United States decision to substantially reduce the number of troops stationed in South 
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Korea, the British decision to reduce the number of troops and forces in the Falkland 
Islands after the mid-1980s, and the Israeli decision to withdraw its troops from southern 
Lebanon.   
In order to evaluate Chinese perceptions and behaviors and determine whether 
they agree with this thesis, I have examined a number of difference sources. I use 
translated primary sources from Chinese intellectuals, leaders, and military officers. I 
obtained these sources through the CIA Open Source Center.36  The Open Source Center 
translates documents from Chinese and other languages into English. I also use Xinhua 
documents that have been translated and publically released in English.37  Examples of 
primary documents include “Maritime Geostrategy and the Development of the Chinese 
Navy in the Early Twenty-First Century,”38 along with other sources.39  Additionally, I 
examine secondary sources that analyze these primary documents in the larger context of 
the revolution in military affairs, Chinese future military and diplomatic planning, and 
observed Chinese military modernization. Examples of these compilation sources include 
The Dragon’s Quantum Leap,40 which discusses China’s advancing cyber capabilities 
and philosophy, and The Great Wall at Sea,41 which discusses China’s maritime 
advancements. I will also utilize online academic sources like the Jamestown 
Foundation’s China Brief.42  Other primary sources referenced concerning the RMA and 
Chinese perceptions are Chinese government publications such as China’s “White Paper 
on National Defense.”  Additionally, I will look at U.S. government reports that analyze 
China such as the Office of Secretary of Defense “Military and Security Developments 
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Involving the People’s Republic of China.”  Finally, I examine China’s military 
modernization through translated primary sources and secondary sources such as Dennis 
Blasko’s The Chinese Military Today. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The following five chapters of this thesis are broken down as the following:  the 
second chapter examines the conventional wisdom surrounding the string of pearls theory 
and Chinese nationalist expansionist theories, offering rebuttals to each viewpoint. The 
third chapter expands on technological improvements. This chapter looks at the 
revolution in military affairs (RMA) and how the advances in technology have altered the 
battlefield. This chapter focuses on the ability to gather large amounts of intelligence with 
a minimal footprint outside of a host nation. This can be done through satellite and space 
systems, open source intelligence, unmanned vehicles, and cyber reconnaissance and 
warfare. This chapter also looks at how force projection can now be accomplished with 
fewer overseas forces. 
 The fourth chapter examines historical cases illustrating the changes that have 
resulted from the RMA. Specifically, this chapter examines the reduction in overseas 
manpower and footprints, and how this is related to the RMA. The fifth chapter focuses 
on Chinese perceptions concerning the RMA and whether these perceptions support the 
hypothesis that the improvements in C4ISR significantly reduce the need for large 
overseas military bases. The sixth chapter offers a conclusion and assesses the 
implications presented in this thesis. 
 If this thesis is correct, what are some assessments for the future of Chinese 
maritime activities?  First, China could probably continue to invest in space, cyber, and 
unmanned vehicles. One possible example of unmanned vehicle development is the 
Chinese announcement that it will begin using unmanned aerial vehicles instead of 
manned planes to patrol its maritime environment.43  Second, these new technologies 
could lead to new military strategies concerning intelligence collection and force 
                                                 
43 “UAVs to replace manned aircraft in marine surveillance,” People’s Daily Online, Sept. 1, 2012, 
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90786/7932405.html. 
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deployment. These new strategies could accomplish the same military objectives from 
within China, which previously would have required overseas military forces. These new 
strategies could focus on space and cyber as the first contested areas of warfare with 
traditional kinetic forces being relegated to a secondary role. Finally, if this thesis is 
accurate, Chinese military maritime forces will continue to develop overseas places in 
foreign countries that can be used as logistics hubs, but would refrain from developing 
any large, overseas military bases. 
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II. THE “STRING OF PEARLS” CONVENTIONAL WISDOM 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
The second section examines two slightly different variants of the convention 
wisdom that China is planning to build a string of pearls. The first version of the 
conventional wisdom argues that the Mahan strategic model is still relevant today and 
that China will continue to follow this model to increase its military power 
internationally. The second version assesses that China is attempting to restore its great 
power status and is therefore trying to attain all the symbols it associates with being a 
great power, foreign bases being one of those. This second version has less to do with the 
strategic significance of the Mahan model and is more focused on the PRC government 
convincing the Chinese domestic audience—as well as the international audience—that 
China is now a great power. Both of these arguments justify China looking at establishing 
large, overseas military bases, but differ in their strategic reasons for why China will take 
this step.   
These two theories will be disputed by examining the Chinese debate about 
Mahan and how there is currently no single view on how Mahan should be interpreted. A 
second factor against China building a string of pearls is the cost and complication of 
building overseas military bases in the 21st century.   
While overseas places such as Gwadar can be used for limited HUMINT or 
passive intelligence gathering, this is unlike active intelligence gathering. Active 
intelligence gathering would require a larger military base with military personnel to 
conduct operations like flying reconnaissance aircraft or basing reconnaissance military 
vessels at the port. However, with the new capabilities brought online by the revolution in 
military affairs, it no longer makes sense to collect intelligence via overseas bases—for a 
variety of reasons. The first reason is the high cost associated with deploying military 
personnel and equipment to various different locations around the world, providing 
logistical support to them, and protecting them and their equipment. The problem is that 
the intelligence collected via this method is scattered and incomplete, and provides a 
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marginal return on investment. The second reason is that intelligence collection is more 
effective with the new capabilities that can now be utilized from a state’s own country. 
These capabilities include satellites that can provide imagery over a wide area and cyber 
espionage. Both of these new capabilities provide more complete, accurate, and timely 
information than most intelligence forces stationed at overseas bases. 
B.  STRING OF PEARLS THEORY 
1.  Official Guidance and Maritime Strategy  
The first string of pearls theory assesses that China still believes in the Mahan 
model, and is using it as a template to guide its maritime expansion in the 21st century. 
This theory argues that advances in intelligence and force projection are still not 
important enough to offset the advantages of overseas military bases. In order to assess 
this hypothesis, the argument is broken down into the following sections:  First, official 
Chinese guidance and quotes from senior Chinese leaders supporting this hypothesis are 
presented, along with Chinese maritime strategy. This is followed by how Mahan is 
mentioned in Chinese academic and military literature. The paper then looks to the 
specific mention of overseas bases in Chinese literature and commentary by other 
observers. The first theory presentation concludes with evidence that, although China has 
not built a string of pearls yet, it is on the cusp of changing its policy and breaking with 
tradition. Finally, I explain why this theory is incorrect due to a lack of Chinese 
consensus on what Mahan means and the cost of building overseas military bases in the 
21st century.   
 When Chinese sources discuss the PLA’s maritime goals and objectives, they 
often point to official remarks and policy statements to illustrate the expanding interests 
of China over the last decade. In “On Maritime Strategy Access,” Liang Fang, a senior 
captain in the PLAN—who has a doctorate in strategic studies from National Defense 
University, and is also an instructor at the same location—points to the guidance 
President Hu Jintao gave regarding the maritime realm and China’s navy,  
It is a must to improve the strategic capabilities of maritime security and 
protection, to defend the nation’s sovereignty of the territorial sea and 
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maritime rights and interests, and to protect the security of the nation’s 
developing strategic access for the maritime industry, the maritime 
shipping, and the energy resources.44 
 Later on in the book, Liang Fang illustrates how this broad official guidance is to 
be translated into increasing naval forces and naval missions in the maritime realm by 
citing a speech from President Hu Jintao: “To construct a powerful people’s Navy well-
matched to the status of the nation and adaptable to the requirements of the PLA’s 
historical mission in the new phase of the new century.’”45  Other Chinese observers 
point to more bellicose rhetoric from senior Chinese military leaders to confirm China’s 
Mahanian string of pearls aspirations. As Robert Kaplan quotes in 2009, “Zhao Nanqi, 
former director of the General Logistics Department of the People’s Liberation Army, 
proclaimed in 1993, ‘We can no longer accept the Indian Ocean as an ocean only of the 
Indians.’”46  Kaplan also presents evidence that China has decided that India is China’s 
future greatest threat, “Zhang Ming, [is] a Chinese naval analyst… ‘India is perhaps 
China’s most realistic strategic adversary,’ Zhang has written. ‘Once India commands the 
Indian Ocean, it will not be satisfied with its position and will continuously seek to 
extend its influence, and its eastward strategy will have a particular impact on China.’”47 
Besides providing an idea for a Mahan strategy, Liang Fang also outlines the 
geographic and political constraints that China will face as it seeks to expand in the 
maritime realm, “Access for China to enter and exit from the ocean is obstructed by a 
ring-shaped island chain, which makes China under the control of others to a certain 
extent and makes it very possible to be intercepted by the enemy in wartime.”48   
Other Chinese sources look to the future and see the maritime and littoral areas as 
the locations where power will be most intensely contested.  “Contention for sea territory 
will become a new trend of littoral conflicts, and mankind will enter a geopolitical 
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turbulence period … homeland defense will move forward from coastal defense to 
maritime defense.”49  Andrew Erickson examines these issues percolating in the Chinese 
press, and observes new academic and military debates beginning to question old ideals: 
There is no question that within China the issue of overseas basing and the 
stationing of PLA troops abroad is being robustly debated. An 
examination of the open press in China illustrates that there is an 
unofficial line of thought suggesting the need for Chinese overseas 
facilities.50 
However, while there is a debate in the Chinese literature, there is still no 
agreement about what the correct future strategic plan should be. This lack of consensus 
will be further explored later in this chapter. Additionally all of the overseas basing 
debate is still unofficial and Chinese official government statements continue to agree 
with the party line that China does not establish overseas bases. 
2.  A “Cult of Mahan” in Chinese Thinking? 
The next question is how Mahan is discussed in Chinese literature. This paper 
focuses on Chinese sources that show support for the Mahan version of military warfare. 
The first piece of evidence of a possible “Cult of Mahan” is a Chinese CCTV eight-part 
documentary released in late 2011 and focused on sea power. In the documentary, 
“Towards the Sea,” Part Four is devoted almost entirely to discussing Mahan, “The 
documentary (Part Four) cites Alfred Thayer Mahan’s book The Influence of Sea Power 
Upon History to say that a nation’s prosperity, development, and security is ‘closely tied 
to its sea power,’ because ‘not only does sea power determine victories in sea and land 
battles, but it also determines the course of history.’”51 
The documentary goes on to describe how Japan and the United States embraced 
Mahan and became powerful in the 20th century, while China ignored Mahan and 
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suffered a century of humiliation. Liang Fang also quotes Mahan multiple times, 
providing legitimacy for her arguments for a strong navy: “Mahan once pointed out that it 
is necessary to have two strategic elements to control a commercial route, one is a mobile 
navy, and the other is a port near the route to serve as the base for naval operations.”52   
Other Chinese authors have concluded that Mahan’s philosophy is still being 
followed by all the powerful navies of the present day: “Up to the present, all maritime 
powers in the world continue to follow the thinking expressed by “On Sea Power” and 
pursue a maritime offensive strategy and a military line from the sea to the land.”53 
This emphasis in Chinese sources has led many Chinese watchers to conclude that 
China has decided Mahan is the gold standard, including James Holmes:  
American theorist’s oft-cited description of command of the sea as “that 
overbearing power on the sea which drives the enemy’s flag from it, or 
allows it to appear only as a fugitive.” Indeed, this bellicose-sounding 
phrase is by far the most common Mahan quotation to appear in Chinese 
commentary.54 
Such authors cite evidence showing Chinese leaders believe that Mahan is still the 
strategic building block for a navy.  
James Holmes also sees Beijing’s 2004 White Paper confirming his hypothesis, 
“Beijing’s 2004 Defense White Paper instructs the armed forces to ‘strengthen the 
capabilities for winning both command of the sea and command of the air.’ This remains 
the clearest statement of China’s Mahanian outlook.”55  In fact, Holmes concludes his 
introduction to his book with the following statement, “This study contends that Alfred 
Thayer Mahan’s writings and theories on seas power furnish an indispensable framework 
for understanding China’s emerging maritime strategy.”56  
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Robert Kaplan goes even further, stating that both rising powers in the Pacific 
have found Mahan to be their guiding light, “The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 
1660–1783, which argued that the power to protect merchant fleets had been the 
determining factor in world history. Both Chinese and Indian naval strategists read him 
avidly nowadays.”57   
While Kaplan acknowledges that technology advances have created changes in 
the economic and military realms, he dismisses these as insignificant factors: “Although 
recent technological advances and economic integration have encouraged global thinking, 
some places continue to count more than others.”58  Instead, Kaplan focuses on where the 
sea lines of communication are and bases his military theories around the control of 
specific geographic key maritime nodes: “Even today, in the jet and information age, 90 
percent of global commerce and about 65 percent of all oil travel by sea.”59 
3.  From Mahan Strategy to Chinese Overseas Military Bases 
 With Mahan philosophy incorporated in the Chinese military and academic 
community, the next step is to ascertain whether this is beginning to affect the Chinese 
perception on building overseas military bases. Liang Fang acknowledges the importance 
of overseas military bases: “Maritime Bases Must Be Relied Upon To Ensure The 
Security Of Strategic Maritime Passages…According to the law of distance attenuation in 
geography, the greater the distance from the target being controlled, the weaker the 
ability to control it; conversely, the stronger it is.”60 
 Liang goes on to state that if the Chinese military wants to continue to operate far 
from the Chinese coast, it is imperative to establish overseas military bases. “When a 
country’s navy operates in battlefields far from the country, the necessity to acquire 
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permanent positions in those regions is inevitable; whether or not the navy’s activities are 
effective is closely tied to these positions.”61 
 Outside observers also see Chinese discussions and actions, and conclude that 
China is strategically planning to develop overseas military capabilities. “Some 
assessments, many coming out of Indian think tanks and defense organizations, state 
unequivocally that the objective of China’s string of pearls strategy is to dominate the 
Indian Ocean Region.”62  The Asia Times newspaper is one of the most outspoken 
sources when it comes to discussing China’s string of pearls. “The clout of China—which 
many within the Indian defense establishment unabashedly declare as the greatest long-
term threat to India’s security—continues to grow, and the manifestations of this power 
are largely sea-based.”  In an article from 2006, the Asia Times lists all the different 
projects China is working on in the Indian Ocean and ties them all together into a plan for 
China to militarily dominate India in the Indian Ocean:  
Gwadar port has a far-larger significance in China’s scheme of things. It is 
said to be the western-most pearl in China’s “string of pearls” strategy 
(this is a strategy that envisages building strategic relations with several 
countries along sea lanes from the Middle East to the South China Sea to 
protect China’s energy interests and other security objectives), the other 
“pearls” being naval facilities in Bangladesh, Myanmar, Thailand, 
Cambodia and the South China Sea.63 
 The BBC has, over the years, also presented various articles that illustrate China’s 
growing intentions in the Indian Oceans. The first article in 2007 looked at developments 
in Gwadar. “The port is said to be part of Chinese naval expansion along the Asian and 
African coasts called the ‘string of pearls’ initiative, according to a U.S. Department of 
Defense report.”64  This was followed in 2009 by reports that China was thinking of 
establishing an overseas military base in the Indian Ocean. “A senior Chinese naval 
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officer has suggested that China establish a permanent base in the Gulf of Aden to 
support its anti-piracy operations. Rear Admiral Yin Zhou’s proposal was posted on the 
defence ministry website.”65  In 2010, the BBC examined developments in Chittagong:  
The Indians fear that although these deep sea ports will be for trade, China 
could call them in for military or strategic purposes if oil becomes scarce.  
‘When you put together all these jigsaw puzzles it becomes clear that 
Chinese focus in Indian Ocean is not just for trade,’ says Professor 
Kondapalli. ‘It is a grand design for the 21st Century.’66  
 In late 2011, the BBC looked at developments in the Seychelles and Nepal, and 
again linked it to a larger Chinese military strategy, going so far as to title the article The 
New Great Game. “But while it could not stop the Seychelles hosting China’s new base, 
India drew the line earlier this year when Nepal—landlocked between the two giants—
contemplated accepting $3bn (£2bn) worth of Chinese investment.”67 
There are also variations and expansions on the string of pearls theory. Robert 
Kaplan has assessed that once China resolves the Taiwan problem it can quickly move on 
to China’s real objective—the Indian Ocean. “One reason that Beijing wants desperately 
to integrate Taiwan into its dominion is so that it can redirect its naval energies away 
from the Taiwan Strait and toward the Indian Ocean.”68  Another article published in the 
Canadian Naval Review in 2009 mentions unconfirmed reports that China was building a 
submarine base in the Maldives. “It is also widely reported that in 2005 China signed a 
deal with then-President Abdul Gayoom to construct a submarine base in the 
Maldives.”69  Asia Times indicates that China has shifted its string of pearls strategy and 
now wants to start by building military bases in Pakistan, and then shift to naval bases:  
While Pakistan wants China to build a naval base at its southwestern 
seaport of Gwadar in Balochistan province, Beijing is more interested in 
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setting up military bases either in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas 
(FATA) of Pakistan or in the Federally Administered Northern Areas 
(FANA) that border Xinjiang province.70 
In conclusion, various sources view China’s maritime developments and 
discussions of Mahan strategy as evidence that China has future intentions to build 
maritime overseas military bases. 
4.  An Approaching Shift in Chinese Foreign Policy? 
The hypothesis of a string of pearls is based on an economically vibrant China 
that is looking to secure additional international economic resources. Part of this theory 
relies on the idea that China’s phenomenal growth will continue at its current pace; 
however, economic studies indicate that China might be reaching an economic plateau in 
the near future.71  Additionally the string of pearls theory assumes that as China’s 
economic and security interests grow, it will change its policy on oversea bases when 
necessary. To support this theory, Chinese observers point to what happened with the 
acquisition of China’s first aircraft carrier to illustrate how quickly China’s viewpoint can 
change concerning military matters. “People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) held a 
naval review to mark the sixtieth anniversary of its founding and—after years of studied 
denials—the PLA leadership has more or less openly stated that it wants to acquire 
aircraft carriers.”72  Now there are reports in the official media that discuss building 
additional carriers: “Another assessment in China’s official media suggests that China 
should develop several overseas bases and build three or four aircraft carriers.”73 
According to the string of pearls theory, China is in the process of making a 
similar change to its policy of overseas bases. This change in Chinese policy began with 
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the anti-piracy deployments as a convenient way to break the taboo of talking about 
overseas bases without sounding expansionist or hegemonic. “PLAN experience with 
anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden that began in December 2008 appears to have 
sparked a debate over the efficacy of continuing to adhere to China’s oft-stated and 
longstanding policy of refraining from establishing any overseas military bases.”74 
 From their expansionist theory, one would expect to see the Chinese media 
unofficially discuss the overseas bases concept to see what type of reaction would occur 
from the international community. “Global Times—the offshoot of People’s Daily—PLA 
Air Force (PLAAF) Colonel Dai Xu openly advocated the development of overseas bases 
to ‘safeguard commercial interests and world peace.’”75  If the international community 
reacted with alarm then China could always say that it was only the position of one 
military member and repeat the phrase that China does not build overseas military bases. 
China could also try to frame the issue around its anti-piracy deployments to gain support 
for its position that it needs overseas bases in order to continue to participate and help the 
international community,  
It is an international practice for naval fleets on long voyage missions to 
replenish at the nearest port of coastal countries. China will consider using 
suitable ports in Seychelles and other countries for the replenishment and 
rest of naval fleets in light of their needs in escort and long voyage 
missions. Such practice is transparent, and there is no need to worry.76 
The string of pearls theory also expects that while China might initially be 
building commercial facilities in Gwadar and other Indian Ocean ports, this is really just 
a first step towards building a military base. The idea is that once China has established 
these initial supply points, it will slowly upgrade them until one day they will have all the 
aspects of a military base. These advocates point to comments like those from Li Jie, a 
senior captain in the PLAN discussing future international operations: “At that time, we 
shouldn’t emphasize those traditional principles anymore. In the future, China may 
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consider upgrading the function of overseas support points.”77  Another example is 
comments from Han Xudong, a professor at National Defense University, “China should 
firstly focus on ‘going out’ and then discuss the establishment of overseas naval bases. 
It’s necessary for China to have its own overseas navy bases to safeguard its expanding 
interests abroad.”78 
C.  PROBLEMS WITH THE STRING OF PEARLS THEORY 
1. Mahan’s Many Different Meanings 
Many problems are involved with the string of pearls theory and the Mahan 
philosophical model on which it is based. These problems include Chinese debate about 
Mahan, complications in building a string of pearls, the idea of “places not bases,” and 
new technology. First, there is a wide variety of opinion when trying to interpret how 
Chinese thinkers view Mahan. James Holmes examines the data and determines that there 
are two probable reasons for the lack of a unified Mahan theory in Chinese writings. The 
first reason is, “PLAN thinkers may still be translating, reading, and digesting his theories 
and considering how to apply them to Chinese foreign policy goals.”79 While the second 
reason is, “Chinese navalists may simply be using Mahan to lobby for a big navy 
composed of expensive, high-tech platforms.”80  There is also the theory developed in 
this thesis that the revolution in military affairs has resulted in overseas military bases 
becoming less important.   
When examining Chinese literature, even more variations on Mahan are 
observable. In one Chinese article from AMS, “China: Geothinking on Land-and-Sea 
Integration,” one author highlights the fact that Mahan’s writing were primarily 
concerned with controlling the open ocean, and that China is more concerned with 
limited maritime defense: “The sea power Mahan talked about is not the control of the 
legal waters of one’s own nation, but the occupation and control of the open sea. 
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China…does not seek to control the open sea.”81  Other authors look at the development 
of the United Nations and international law and determine that the conditions Mahan 
described are no longer relevant. “Sea power in the age of globalization is a kind of 
‘governmental power,’ and what is different is that it does not involve exclusive control, 
but is rather a kind of co-governance.”82  Other authors mention how Mahan deals with 
objective concepts, and it is important to interpret Mahan according to the circumstances 
of today which might be different. “Haiquan [sea power] is an objective reality, which 
different countries at different historical stages and against different backdrops will 
understand in different ways.”83  Other Chinese authors wonder if their contemporaries 
are focusing too much on Mahan: “With the strengthening of people’s sense of the ocean, 
some people worship the sea power theory of Mahan and come to the conclusion that 
becoming a major sea power is the inevitable route of rising as a major power. This idea 
has some truth to it, but an in-depth analysis is needed.”84   
Finally, another author cited the limited objectives of China and ruled out 
Mahan’s goal of dominating maritime trade. “China’s goal for its national development 
in the next 50 years will be a ‘medium-developed country,’ which was set by Comrade 
Deng Xiaoping. Consistent with this goal, China’s sea power should only be limited sea 
power.”85  The conclusion that can be reached from this variety of official literature is 
that the Chinese military has not reached a definite conclusion of whether Mahan’s 
theories are still relevant. Right now, both the pro-Mahan and anti-Mahan sides are using 
military journals to propose their theories and dispute their opponents’ theories. Three 
different futures are possible:  Pro-Mahan forces win the debate and China begins to 
build overseas bases. Anti-Mahan forces win the debate and China continues to work 
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within the international framework to accomplish its objectives while developing new 
capabilities including cyber and space. Finally, the debate could continue for the 
foreseeable future, resulting in a number of different policies being pursued depending on 
the international environment.  
2.  Complications and Cost Overruns 
Other problems with the string of pearls are the complications and cost overruns 
that would accompany such a large strategic plan. With multiple bases in multiple 
countries thousands of miles away from China, coordination and construction would be 
very difficult. Additionally, such a large undertaking with limited oversight would prove 
fertile ground for Chinese and host country corruption, which would further driving up 
costs.    Two pieces of evidence point to this issue. The first piece of evidence is a speech 
made by Gen. Liu Yuan that described the corruption in the People’s Liberation Army in 
December 2011. “No country can defeat China,” Liu told about 600 officers in his 
department in unscripted comments to an enlarged party meeting on the afternoon of 
December 29, according to sources who have verified notes of his speech. “Only our own 
corruption can destroy us and cause our armed forces to be defeated without fighting.”86  
This problem has been directly linked to challenges in securing links to overseas basing 
in the cancellation of a contract for navigational channel buoys from China by the 
Gwadar Port Authority in March 2010, due to perceived corrupt practices, 
According to the complaints, the GPA ordered installation of 17 new 
channel buoys at an exorbitant cost of Rs 67 million. The cost of each 
buoy was Rs 3.94 million against the market price of Rs 1.65m (inclusive 
of solar light). Notwithstanding the exorbitant prices, there was no need to 
replace the channel buoys since the technical life of the buoys is 16 years, 
and the current buoys were placed in the Gwadar port channel in 2007.87 
Finally, China would have to deal with local bureaucracies and red tape from each 
of these different countries, which would further complicate and delay any plan. China is 
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already encountering many of these problems as it attempts to develop the commercial 
potential of Gwadar. One of the most significant problems is the violence occurring in the 
surrounding community. “According to official data, there were 187 bomb blasts, 275 
rocket attacks, eight attacks on gas pipelines, 36 attacks on electricity-transmission lines 
and 19 explosions on railway lines in 2005. At least 182 civilians and 26 security force 
personnel died in the province during 2005.”88   
In addition to the violence, cost overruns became a growing source of tension. 
“Pakistan has now raised the cost of Chinese participation to U.S.$3 billion in addition to 
the $1.5 billion yearly payment, which China has refused, saying it is steep, and in breach 
of the terms of the contract.”89 
 Another complication with the string of pearls idea is that it does not make 
military sense. As Andrew Erickson pointed out:  
Due to geographical location, if the Chinese stationed naval and air forces 
on the “String of Pearls” sites, these forces would easily be vulnerable to 
Indian air and missile attacks. Some Indian analysts have pointed out that 
Chinese naval and air forces would find themselves consistently at a 
numerical disadvantage to Indian military forces which can, owing to their 
proximity, more easily concentrate their forces…the stationing of Chinese 
military forces at the “String of Pearls” sites would isolate these forces at 
great distances  from China—which would make them unavailable for a 
hypothetical maritime conflict with the United States or one of China’s 
other rivals in East Asia.90 
This quote identifies an important strategic reason why China would not establish 
a string of pearls. By placing a significant amount of forces in the Indian Ocean, China is 
effectively isolating them from any type of military support. If a conflict with the United 
States or India were to break out, these forces would be unlikely to be able to repel a 
United States carrier task force or a prolonged Indian attack. This would result in the 
Chinese having to make a decision to either sacrifice the forces in place—to hold out as 
long as possible—or abandon the base before a conflict began. Both of these scenarios 
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point to the problem of having a base located geographically far from its homeland with 
no strong military ally in the region that could offer support. This is a similar situation to 
what happened to the United Kingdom with its Singapore base at the beginning of World 
War II.91  In the Singapore case, Britain ended up losing the military base, along with 
wasting a military division and two naval ships that could have been more effective 
elsewhere.  
D. CHINESE NATIONALISM AND GREAT POWER STATUS 
The second string of pearls theory has less to do with the strategic significant of 
the Mahan model and is more focused on Chinese nationalism. This theory is based on 
the idea that China wants to reclaim its place as a “great power,” and judges its great 
power status by comparing its military capabilities to other great power nations. 
According to this theory, since other great power nations like the United States, Russia, 
Great Britain, and France have overseas bases and aircraft carriers, China should also 
seek to acquire these symbols of great power legitimacy. This theory can be divided into 
a historical past section, a small-vs.-big countries section, and a modern-day great power 
section. 
 The first section looks at the historical narrative the Chinese government has 
created concerning its maritime role and how it establishes a baseline for modern-day 
Chinese military power projection goals. In many different articles and news reports, 
China’s military aspirations are often compared to what China was capable of in the past, 
specifically Zheng He’s seven voyages. “At the beginning of the 15th century, Zheng 
He’s seven voyages to the Western Seas went as far as the western coast of Africa. 
China’s sea influence reached its zenith at that time. Following this, China suddenly 
completely withdrew from the seas.”92  Zheng He’s voyages are used as a baseline for 
how far China has to go to regain its rightful position in the international arena.   
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 These stories also provide China a historical claim and legitimacy for the future if 
they try and reestablish military places or bases in the Indian Ocean. “Yin Zhuo, a 
prominent spokesman on naval matters, made his suggestion to establish a permanent 
base in the area … During the 15th Century, Chinese naval explorers reached the East 
African coast, visiting Mogadishu and Malindi.”93  The next historical incident that 
China uses to frame its current ambitions is the Cold War. In different articles, Chinese 
scholars examine the United States policy of containment against the USSR and compare 
it to what they perceive the United States is attempting to accomplish. “Faced with the 
new situation of an ascendant China and a trend toward ocean development, the United 
States is currently building an alliance like that used during the Cold War period to 
contain the Soviet Union.”94   
 Besides utilizing its history to build a case for increased maritime activity and 
possible overseas bases, China also frequently states that, as a “large country,” it should 
have more rights in the international arena than a smaller country. China bases its claim 
as a maritime great power based on its extensive access to the sea. “China is a large 
nation of land as well as a large nation of ocean with an “ocean territory” of around 3 
million square kilometers, coastlines of 18,000 kilometers, and more than 6,500 coastal 
islands. These determine the status of China as a world maritime power.”95 
 Chinese authors have recently begun to utilize the idea that in the international 
relations, other countries that are smaller in size or population should not try and tell 
larger countries what to do. “The recent Sino-Philippine dispute over Huangyan Island 
[Scarborough Reef] attracted the world’s attention, because it was a rare case of territorial 
sovereignty dispute between a small country and a large country.”96  Thus, by using the 
terms “small country” and “large country,” China evokes the idea that it should have 
more rights in the international arena than most of the maritime countries surrounding it. 
                                                 
93 “China floats idea of first overseas naval base,” BBC News website,  Dec. 30, 2009. 
94 “PRC Scholar Examines U.S.-China Marine Geopolitics, Strategy in Globalization” Taipingyang 
Xuebao, 25 Dec 2010, Open Source Center CPP20110511671002. 
95 Fang, On Maritime Strategic Access, 10. 
96 “PRC Article Accuses U.S. of Using SCS Sovereignty Rows to Contain China,” Zhongguo 
Qingnian Bao Online,  Jul. 13, 2012, Open Source Center CPP20120713787017. 
 31 
 Finally, China looks to other great power countries to figure out the symbols of 
being a Great Power. China does this by looking at the United States as the ultimate 
display of what a great power should be. Thus, China looks to what the United States has 
accomplished in the maritime realm and seeks to begin to build similar power:  
The nine world powers that have appeared in the world in modern times 
are all sea powers. These nations attach extremely great importance to 
maritime rights. In particular, the importance attached to maritime rights 
by the United States is more than any other country can compare with.97 
One of the ways that China can increase its maritime military is to eventually 
build overseas bases. Since the United States already has overseas military bases, the 
Chinese assess that the United States has no right to complain. “Setting up overseas 
military bases is not an idea we have to shun; on the contrary, it is our right. Bases 
established by other countries appear to be used to protect their overseas rights and 
interests.”98  Other Chinese officials are more direct about the hypocrisy of Western 
nations telling China it should not build overseas military bases. “The Western countries 
built military bases to expand their influence and protect national interests. They don’t 
have the qualifications to point fingers at China.”99 
E.  PROBLEMS WITH THE CHINESE NATIONALISM ARGUMENT 
The idea, that the only way China can become a Great Power is by building 
overseas military bases, is flawed. One counterargument is that overseas military bases 
are an outdated concept to measure Great Power status. This is apparent when examining 
the trend in Great Powers and international bases over the last twenty years. If China 
were to look at the United States, it would see that the United States is, overall, reducing 
and eliminating more overseas military bases than it is creating. The best example of this 
is the United States’ shrinking presence in South Korea.   
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 Instead, China can demonstrate that it is becoming a Great Power in other ways. 
One of these is with its technological development. China has been sending individuals 
into space. Another way to show it is a Great Power would be to land a man on the moon. 
Other ways to demonstrate its Great Power status are with Olympics medals, urban 
development, and quality of life improvements. 
A problem with China developing overseas bases is that it could also lead to 
balancing behavior in Asia against China. While nationalism and Great Power status are 
goals of China, another goal is to maintain a stable economy and international 
environment. China benefits from the current political and economic system and it would 
have to carefully consider the impact that establishing an overseas military base would 
have on its international relations. 
Chinese authors can also find other military ways to demonstrate their great 
power status besides just building overseas military bases. One of these is to build new 
advanced weapon systems. “China must vigorously increase its military modernization. 
In particular, it must enhance the strength of the navy and develop aircraft carrier, 
submarine, aircraft, and missile technologies to take control of the sea supremacy that has 
been monopolized by the United States.”100 
F. CONCLUSION 
 In conclusion, there are two primary variants of the string of pearls theory that 
contest this thesis that China will not build large overseas military bases. The first variant 
is the string of pearls theory that states China’s maritime strategic objective is to build a 
series of military bases in the Indian Ocean to protect its energy security and offer better 
force projection. However, there are significant problems with this theory, including the 
logistical complications and military vulnerability that such a process would entail. The 
second variant is that China will seek to build international military bases as a symbol 
that it has finally achieved “Great Power” status. While this is a possibility, there are 
other less costly and more effective ways for China to show its great power status.   
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 Another theory as to why China will not develop oversea military bases—
developed in the remainder of this thesis—is that large overseas military bases are an 
outdated military concept. Instead, China will focus on more effective ways of projecting 
military power and collecting intelligence. These more effective ways are focused around 
the revolution in military affairs and include developing their cyber, space, and 
unmanned vehicles capabilities.  
 34 
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III. REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS 
“Warfare is not just a matter of hurling mass and energy at one’s enemies; it is also about 
gaining an ‘information edge.’”101 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Chapter III examines how the revolution in military affairs resulted in the same 
military objectives being accomplished with fewer military personnel and a smaller 
overseas footprint. The advancements in military technology have resulted in large 
military overseas bases becoming less important to accomplishing a state’s military 
objectives. This results in countries like the United States reducing the amount of 
overseas personnel and closing some overseas military bases. For a state like China, 
which does not have overseas military bases, new technology provides a better alternative 
to accomplish its military objectives rather than establishing overseas military bases or a 
“string of pearls.” In fact, Chapter IV discusses how some Chinese military leaders now 
view cyber and space as two of the most important war fighting domains. The new 
technology that has changed the nature of intelligence collection and force projection are 
satellites, open source intelligence, unmanned vehicles, and cyber capabilities.   
 One of the most important advances in satellite technology in the last twenty 
years is GPS. “Because GPS makes weapons more accurate, the military needs fewer 
warheads and fewer personnel to take out targets.”102  The Chief of Staff of the United 
States Air Force General Schwartz emphasizes how satellites have changed modern 
warfare. “Global positioning has transformed an entire universe of warfighting capability. 
Our dependence on precision navigation in time will continue to grow.”103  Another 
important advantage of satellites is the imagery capability that they provide. 
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 Open source intelligence has also provided the capability to collect intelligence 
that was previously available only with military planes and ships stationed in overseas 
military bases. As the former head of the CIA Michael Hayden said, “Open source 
intelligence is widely recognized as both an essential capability and a formidable asset in 
our national security infrastructure.”104  In fact, after September 11, open source 
intelligence was considered so important it was one of the key areas of focus for the 
Director of National Intelligence. As Director Hayden explains, “In fact, we saw the 
establishment of the Open Source Center as one of the three most important objectives 
for the ODNI in its first year.”105  While the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service 
(FBIS) had existed before the Open Source Center was created, Director Hayden felt that 
FBIS’s reach could be expanded and the information could be available to more 
government agencies than in the past. 
 Unmanned vehicles have enabled better collection of intelligence and kinetic 
strikes that previously could have been done only with manned reconnaissance aircrafts 
and fighter jets. Combining these capabilities in smaller aircraft reduces the military 
people and logistics needed to deploy to overseas bases. In fact, the unmanned capability 
has been assessed to save the United States from deploying at least 1,000 permanent 
positions to the Middle East immediately after September 2001:  
Satellite relays allow Predator pilots in the U.S. to operate the armed UAV 
in combat in the Middle East. A conservative estimate indicates that this 
then-new reachback method saved the Defense Department the time, cost, 
and effort of moving roughly 1,000 personnel—and all their attendant 
equipment—from the United States to the theater.106 
Post September 11, fewer than 10 Predator Combat Air Patrols would have been 
operational. Now there are over 50 Combat Air Patrols. Hence, the savings in overseas 
personnel and equipment is now probably significantly greater than 1,000 personnel. 
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Finally, cyber capabilities provide states the ability to collect large amounts of 
intelligence and project force in ways that were not possible in the past. A good example 
of this force projection capability would be how the French were unable to fly their 
fighter jets due to a computer virus attack. “The aircraft were unable to download their 
flight plans after databases were infected by a Microsoft virus.”107  Without their flight 
planes the pilots could not determine where their objective was and so were unable to 
accomplish their training mission. 
Satellites, open source intelligence, unmanned vehicles, and cyber capabilities 
have changed the nature of warfare. Countries can now accomplish significant 
intelligence gathering without deploying or by deploying small groups of people. Force 
projection can now be accomplished in ways that were unavailable twenty years ago. Due 
to these advances, overseas military bases are no longer an important part of a country’s 
national security. 
B. BEFORE THE RMA – LIMITED INTELLIGENCE CREATED 
REQUIREMENTS FOR OVERSEAS MILITARY BASES 
 One of the key components of any military, today or in the past, has always been 
intelligence. It is important for a country to know what the capabilities and intentions of 
its neighbors and adversaries are. This is important because if the political situation 
deteriorates and conflict becomes likely, the side with the better intelligence will 
generally have a higher likelihood of victory. Indeed, when generals are determining 
battle plans and campaign strategies, knowing the enemy’s strengths and weaknesses is 
vitally important.   
 In the past, militaries spent significant capital trying to gather intelligence, if it 
could be gathered at all, attempting to reduce the “fog of war.”  Two of the most 
important components of intelligence were enemy capabilities and intentions. 
Capabilities were always the easier to identify because capabilities involve physical 
assets: how many troops does the enemy have, how many tanks, and how many ships?  In 
                                                 




addition to knowing what the enemy had, it was also important to know where the enemy 
had these forces placed. For example, was the enemy marshaling them for an attack?  
Intentions were more difficult to determine, as these usually related to plans and 
objectives. The best way to obtain these was through espionage agencies that could steal 
the battle plan or a source that could intercept communications and relay them back to his 
headquarters, which was not easy.   
 Due to this uncertainty, states kept massive amounts of force on their peripheries 
or in their overseas territories. With limited knowledge of what was over the horizon and 
primitive communication equipment, militaries had to be ready for conflict on short 
notice. Due to limited technology during the 20th century, the costs of increased 
knowledge were substantial in terms of manpower and equipment. Before satellites, 
unmanned vehicles, and cyber - reconnaissance of the surrounding area, identification of 
possible enemy forces relied on scouts, planes, or boats. These were all significantly 
restricted in the area they could cover by both human and machine limitations. Due to the 
nature and danger of the activities, reconnaissance usually involved limited forces. Planes 
could only scout for a limited amount of time before the pilot would have to return due to 
human fatigue or shortage of fuel. A similar situation was involved for boats. While scout 
teams could survive for longer on reconnaissance missions, their main limitation was the 
speed and distance the human body could cover in a set time period, which also 
significantly depended on the terrain.   
A good example of these reconnaissance limitations would be the Battle of 
Midway during World War II. One of the first problems was strategic uncertainty. Where 
in the Pacific were the Japanese planning to attack?  After the Battle of the Coral Sea, the 
United States was initially incognizant as to where the next significant Japanese attack 
would take place.108  Magnifying this problem was the limited amount of intelligence 
sources available to the United States Navy: “Most of the traditional sources of 
intelligence—reconnaissance, prisoner interrogations, and captured documents—were 
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denied to the Navy. The only source available was communications intelligence.”109  The 
Navy did not have access to any of the other types of information because the maritime 
environment and Japanese advance had not allowed the Allies to capture any ships, bases, 
or the people who could normally provide information. Eventually, with the use of 
COMINT, the navy was able to discover that Midway was going to be the next objective 
of the Japanese. However, the Allies were extremely lucky in being able to figure out the 
location of the Japanese attack. For example, “On May 28th, the Japanese changed the 
cipher system, and no further comint [communications intelligence] was produced until 
after the Battle of Midway.”110  If the Japanese had changed their cipher system two 
weeks earlier, the United States would not have been able to figure out where the 
Japanese were going to attack.   
The next “fog of war” issue was more tactical and operational. After the United 
States Navy knew the general location of the next attack, the problem was to actually find 
the Japanese fleet. Indeed, before and during the battle, both sides had difficulty locating 
the opposing Navy. This frequently resulted in fighters and bombers not being used to 
their full potential. For example, one group of United States Navy planes were never able 
to locate their target:  
Unaware of the enemy’s change of course, one group of carrier-based 
fighters and dive bombers searched along the reported track to the 
southeast until shortage of gas forced them to abandon the search and go 
in to Midway. Some were forced down at sea when they ran out 
of gas.111 
It is important to note that these reconnaissance limitations also led to force 
projection limitations because fighters and bombers were unable to locate their targets. 
Hence, during these types of conflicts in earlier eras, it was necessary to have significant 
military forces in the area to ensure that the military objectives, sinking the other side’s 
carriers, could be accomplished.   
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C. POST-RMA – SATELLITE INTELLIGENCE PROVIDES 
INTELLIGENCE AND CAPABILITES, REDUCING THE NEED FOR 
OVERSEAS BASES 
 Due to the RMA and improvements in technology, the 21st century has witnessed 
a complete change in the capability to gather intelligence and project force over long 
distances. One of the most significant changes has been the invention and deployment of 
satellites. “Satellite technology has become an indispensable part of modern society - 
being used for everything from mapping and weather forecasts to communications.”112  
Satellites have enabled countries to collect intelligence that previously was not obtainable 
due to the distances involved and the denial of over-flight privileges. Satellites have also 
enabled reconnaissance collection that was only available via manned aircraft stationed in 
overseas bases, “the Department of Defense (DoD)… developed ‘remote sensing’ 
devices that would permit the gathering of accurate information on capabilities of 
potential enemies without entailing the risks of manned over flights or of covert 
agents.”113  By helping reduce the fog of war, satellites have reduced the necessity to 
keep overseas bases always on alert against a possible surprise attack. Additionally, by 
offering a replacement for some airborne intelligence collection, it has enabled countries 
to reduce their overseas military footprints. While satellites have been around for 
decades, before the 1990s, it was only the United States and the Soviet Union that had 
access to large amount of satellite imagery intelligence. The limitations of access to 
satellite imagery for other countries become apparent when examining the Military 
Satellite tables from the Military Balance (See Figure 2). 114  Excluding the United 
States, Russia, and NATO, in 1997, only four other countries had military satellites 
operating in space. Of these four other countries, China’s satellites had an expected orbit 
time of less than three weeks, and Israel’s satellite had an expected orbit of only two 
years. Additionally, all of these countries had launched their satellites after 1987.   
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Figure 2.   National Military Satellites in 1997115 
Legend 
SSO = Sun Synchronous Orbit / Recce = Reconnaissance / Surv = Surveillance 
ELINT = Electronic Signals Intelligence / Sigint = Signals Intelligence 
USPU = Type of Russian satellite 
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Compare this to the 2003 Military Balance Military Satellite Table (Figure 3), 
where six different countries have operational military satellites.116  The numbers next to 
the satellite names represent the number of satellites in each group. Orbit time has been 
eliminated from tables after 1997. One item to notice is that China has expanded its 
satellite capabilities to include reconnaissance, communication, and navigation.  
 
 
Figure 3.   National Military Satellites in 2003117 
Finally, the substantial increase in satellite capability over the last ten years can be 
witnessed from the Military Balance’s 2011 Military Satellite Table. There are so many 
nation-state satellites in orbit that the institute decided to break down the data by 
functionality. For simplicity, this section focuses on imagery satellites. By examining 
Figure 4, it is apparent that many different nations have found imagery satellites to be 
worth the investment. In 1997, besides the United States and Russia, only two other states 
had the capability to take images from space for an extended period of time: France and 
Israel. Yet by 2011, this capability significantly expanded—in both new countries being 
added to the list and the quantity of satellites countries are able to maintain in orbit (See 
Figure 4). This additional capability allows national level decision makers additional 
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intelligence to make more informed decisions on how many forces they need to have 




Figure 4.   National Military Satellites in 2011118 
Additionally, before 1991, satellite imagery intelligence was mainly used at the 
national level and not available for tactical use. This changed, however, in the early 
1990s: “Beginning with Desert Shield in 1991, however, these national-level systems 
began to be adapted to tactical use in Iraq, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and 
elsewhere.”119  Allowing satellite imagery to be used at the tactical level gave regional 
commanders more situational awareness of their potential battlespace, leading to the 
ability to reposition forces based on a better understanding of the threat in each area. 
With better information, decision makers were able to reduce forward deployed troops in 
order to better manage their forces.  
 So what does this additional and better imagery mean in respect to overseas 
military bases?  This capability now means that information you could previously obtain 
only via reconnaissance flights, or with soldiers on the ground, can now be done 
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remotely. This led to some countries discontinuing some deceptive practices that no 
longer work in the 21st century. For example, “In August 2006, the British Ordnance 
Survey...announced that it would end an 80-year program of falsifying maps...had been 
made obsolete by high resolution satellite imagery and sources available on the 
Internet.”120  They also provide countries like the United States the ability to track an 
adversary’s military forces such as submarines.121  Overall, the improved capabilities and 
quantity of satellite systems has allowed better and more comprehensive intelligence 
collection for many countries that previously had little access to overhead imagery, thus 
reducing the fog of war and the footprint of overseas manned collection platforms.   
 Satellites, however, can be used for more than just imagery. Satellites can also be 
used to transmit data and imagery information around the world. This is an important part 
of the Predator and Reaper operations. Satellites allow the Predator and Reaper the ability 
to be controlled from halfway around the world. This increased capability has led to 
dramatic changes in how the United States strategically deploys forces around the world. 
One example of this is the reduced footprint required to track and eliminate Al-Qaeda. 
Due to the flexibility that satellite communications provide the remote piloted unmanned 
aerial program has become the most effective weapon against Al Qaeda. “United States 
intelligence officials call unmanned aerial vehicles, often referred to as drones, their most 
effective weapon against Al Qaeda.”122   
 Another way that satellites have led to changes in a country’s geostrategic 
behavior is the use of navigation and Global Positioning System (GPS). The GPS system 
was created by the United States military and “provides users with positioning, 
navigation, and timing (PNT) services.”123  The military utilizes GPS to help planes, 
vehicles, missiles, and soldiers determine where they are when conducting operations 
during war and peace. It is considered one of the most important aspects of modern 
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military warfare. “Everything that moves uses it,” said John Pike, director of 
Globalsecurity.org… “It is so central to the American style of war that you just couldn’t 
leave home without it.”124  GPS has also allowed for a reduction in military weapons and 
personnel to accomplish force projection like bombing a bridge, “Because GPS makes 
weapons more accurate, the military needs fewer warheads and fewer personnel to take 
out targets.”125  The reliance of the United States military on GPS was displayed when a 
software glitch in January 2010 resulted in, “A problem that rendered as many as 10,000 
U.S. military GPS receivers useless for days.”126  In fact, the Air Force Chief of Staff 
General Schwartz recommended that the United States start to develop alternatives to 
GPS in case the system was jammed: “It seemed critical to me that the joint force reduce 
its dependence on GPS aid.”127 
In fact, the capabilities that GPS provides are considered so essential to modern 
military capabilities that both Russia and China have created their own satellite 
constellations called GLONASS and Beiduo.128  One of the reasons cited for each 
country developing their own satellite navigation capability is the concern that the United 
States could turn off GPS in the event of a conflict. “But what is also behind the battle for 
control of navigation technology is a fear that the United States could use its monopoly—
the system was developed and is controlled by the military, after all—to switch off 
signals in a time of crisis.”129 
Given this background, what are the implications for the development of overseas 
bases?  Before data transmission capability in satellites, military forces required more 
manpower-intensive communications methods. A military unit would need to have a 
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communications troop for smaller units and a communications shop for larger military 
units. With new data transmission, this information can be passed remotely or with less 
manpower necessary to pass information between different military units overseas and 
stationed in the home country. GPS and global navigation allows for the reduction in 
military forces needed to conduct reconnaissance at overseas. With global navigation 
assistance, units have a better idea of their location, which previously would have 
required reconnaissance flights or scouts.   
D. POST-RMA – OPEN SOURCE INTELLIGENCE EXPANDS OVERSEAS 
COLLECTION WHILE MINIMIZING A MILITARY FOOTPRINT 
 Another significant technological change has been the proliferation of open 
source intelligence on the Internet and in the mass media. While not all of this 
information is accurate and deception is always a possibility, enough relevant and 
important information has begun to change the perception of how intelligence can be 
collected. “One intelligence veteran observed that during the cold war 80 percent of the 
information about the Soviet Union was secret and 20 percent was open, but in the post-
cold war period the ratio had more than reversed for Russia.”130 This intelligence is 
available both on the Internet and from other sources such as newspapers and military 
journals. However, this is true for more than just collection on states. “The former head 
of the CIA’s bin Laden unit commented that ‘open source’ information contains 90% of 
what you need to know.”131 
Open source intelligence “refers to intelligence collected from publicly available 
sources. In the intelligence community (IC), the term ‘open’ refers to overt, publicly 
available sources (as opposed to covert or clandestine sources)”132 One example is the 
initial pictures of the Chinese J-20.133 Other examples include the United States drone 
                                                 
130 Lowenthal, Intelligence, 81. 
131 Richelson, The U.S. Intelligence Community, 322. 
132 “Open Source-Intelligence,” Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open-
source_intelligence#cite_note-2. 
133 David Axe, “Is This China’s First Stealth Fighter?” Wired Danger Room Blog, 
http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/12/is-this-chinas-first-stealth-fighter/. 
 47 
war in Yemen134 and a North Korean jet crash in China.135  The last example, of the 
North Korean jet crash, would have been very difficult for anyone outside of China or 
North Korea to have figured out, were it not for the open source reporting. Open source 
intelligence is different today due to the range and scope of available information. 
Previously, information might eventually be compiled into a Jane’s book and eventually 
released. Now, however, an event that happens halfway across the world can be instantly 
disseminated across the intelligence community, and “it makes information far more 
accessible, sometimes more timely, and easier to disseminate. That means that more 
people can be more informed in a shorter amount of time.”136  It also creates the ability to 
quickly share information that previously would have been available only to classified 
audiences: 
By using open-source information, we can distribute it more widely 
among our customers in the State Department than we could if it was 
classified. Not everyone who works with the State Department has top-
secret clearance,” says James Bell, acting director of the Office of 
Research at the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and 
Research.137 
 One example of this increased availability is the creation of Open Source Center 
run by the Direction of National Intelligence that was created in 2005. Additional open 
source intelligence allows intelligence analysts more information that gives them the 
ability to create timely and more knowledgeable products than was possible in the past. 
Don Burke, who works at the CIA Directorate of Science and Technology, provides a 
useful anecdote: “When he began at CIA in 1988, Burke says, there were no personal 
computers on analysts’ desktops.”138  Another strong supporter of open source 
intelligence is the CIA Director Michael Hayden: “Take the recent Russia-Georgia 
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conflict or Pakistan’s political upheaval. Finished intelligence delivered to policymakers 
on those subjects routinely integrated open sources and analyses based on open sources, 
including mainstream media, video, and blogs.”139  
Another example of the importance of open source intelligence is the ability to 
reduce the effectiveness of concealment. First, satellite imagery resolution has improved 
significantly over the past twenty years. Previously when satellite resolution was a few 
feet building a decoy was easy because the imagery could not tell the difference. With 
better cameras on satellites and unmanned vehicles it makes imagery deception much 
more difficult to effectively pull off. Stealth and EMCON (Emissions Control) have also 
become less effective at deception due to increased sensitivity of detection systems and 
new methods. One of the ways that stealth is being defeated is due to increased 
processing power, as Admiral Jonathan Greenert explains in the July 2012 issue of 
Proceedings: 
Stealth ships and aircraft are designed to have a small radar or infrared 
electromagnetic signature at specific frequencies. The frequency ranges at 
which stealth is designed to be most effective are those most commonly 
used by active radar or passive infrared detection systems. At lower 
frequencies detections do not normally provide the resolution or precision 
necessary for accurate targeting. Using more powerful information-
processing, however, military forces will be able to develop target-quality 
data from these lower-frequency passive infrared signals or active-radar 
returns.140 
Another example of new methods that will defeat stealth is due to cell phone 
towers and signals that indicate when and where an object is blocking a signal.141 
 Open source intelligence has allowed the reduction of intelligence-collecting 
personnel and resources on overseas military bases. Previously, some of the information 
collected by open source intelligence would have been available only via reconnaissance 
flights or naval patrols. However, with open source intelligence, the completion of a new 
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bridge or airport is available without having to utilize the same resources. Thus, overseas 
bases can reduce the manpower and vehicles previously required to collect the same 
amount of intelligence. 
E. POST-RMA – UNMANNED VEHICLE CAPABILTIES PROVIDE 
INCREASE ISR AND FORCE PROJECTION WHILE MINIMIZING 
OVERSEAS BASES 
 Unmanned vehicles represent another significant change in intelligence 
collection, reducing uncertainty and shrinking the footprint of reconnaissance overseas. 
Additionally, UAVs are also starting to play a force projection role. This section begins 
by looking at unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and their ISR capabilities, focusing on 
both the United States and international developments. Maritime unmanned vehicles and 
their ISR capabilities are also examined. Finally, unmanned vehicles’ force projection 
capabilities are assessed. The goal is to demonstrate how unmanned vehicles are reducing 
the intelligence and force projection footprint overseas by reducing the manpower and 
manned platforms required to accomplish the same objectives along with their logistical 
trail.   
 The explosion in unmanned aerial vehicle use has significantly changed modern 
warfare. This is illustrated by the vast amount of capability brought online over the last 
decade. “The number of deployed UAS has increased from approximately 167 aircraft in 
2002 to over 6,000 in 2008.”142  Israel is usually created with beginning the current UAV 
evolution,143 but the real changes have happened with the advancements due to the 
RMA. “Although UAS have a long history, only in the last 10–15 years have advances in 
navigation, communications, materials, and other technologies made a variety of current 
UAS missions possible.”144  The best example to start discussing UAVs is with the most 
popular: “The most commonly used UAV systems, Predators and Reapers, are designed 
for tactical use. The Predator flies at altitudes up to 25,000 feet; the Reaper 50,000 feet. 
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Both have an endurance of 24 hours.”145  Another important UAV system is the RQ-4 
Global Hawk, a strategic ISR system. The Predator146 and Reaper147 have revolutionized 
warfare in a number of ways that have a direct impact on the amount of personnel the 
military has to deploy overseas to accomplish its objective. The two most important 
technical developments are duration and control. With UAVs like the Predator, it is now 
possible to provide an area with ISR for as long as 20 hours. Previously, most ISR 
missions could be flown for only 12 hours. As Air Force General Deptula has stated, 
“With the nominal 12-hour limitation on a human in the cockpit removed, the potential of 
RPA to range great distances and maintain sensors and precision weapons over an area of 
interest for longer periods of time created a powerful tool.” 148 
 Thus, if the objective of a mission were to provide ISR coverage of a certain area 
for 20 hours, this would have required two different manned planes and two different sets 
of pilots in the deployed base. However, with the Predator, this can be done with one 
plane. While there still has to be a pilot at the deployed base to perform take-offs and 
landings, the majority of the flight is controlled by a pilot back in the United States. 
Meanwhile, the pilot at the deployed base can perform take offs and landing for multiple 
planes, which previously would have required multiple people. This leads to the second 
important technical development: control. Until the beginning of the 21st century, it 
would have been almost impossible to control a plane from halfway across the world. 
With modern communications technology, however, a Predator, Reaper, or many other 
UAVs can be controlled from theoretically anywhere in the world as long as the 
infrastructure has been built. Thus, once a Predator is in the air, a pilot at Creech Air 
Force Base in Nevada can control it, pilot it, and allow it to accomplish its intelligence 
mission. This remote control means most pilots do not have to be deployed in overseas 
locations to accomplish the mission. It also saves many others from deployment. The 
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sensor operator is also able to remain in the United States. The mission intelligence 
coordinator (MIC) is also able to remain stateside. Additionally, since most of a UAV 
squadron or Wing is still stateside, most of the other personnel remain stateside, 
including members of the squadron leadership. The only people that have to still deploy 
at a similar rate are the maintenance crews.   
Overall, this provides a significant reduction in manpower that would otherwise 
need to be deployed to overseas bases. This also creates additional reductions. With 
fewer people deployed, it reduces the amount of logistical support an overseas base 
requires—these individuals no longer need a room to live in, food to eat, and clothes to 
wear or wash. This reduction in personnel can then lead to either smaller bases or fewer 
overseas bases to accomplish the same intelligence mission.   
 This same reduction in personnel also applies to strategic ISR and objectives. A 
good example of a strategic ISR asset is the RQ-4: “The RQ-4 Global Hawk is a high-
altitude, long-endurance unmanned aircraft system with an integrated sensor suite that 
provides intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, or ISR, capability worldwide.”149  
The Global Hawk has a range of 8,700 nautical miles, which allows it to accomplish 
intelligence missions that were previously unattainable. According to General Deptula, 
“An RQ-4 …could take off from Beale Air Force Base, Calif., be over the Korean 
peninsula 18 hours later, maintain its presence there for eight hours and then land at its 
Pacific base. That’s global reach.”150  This obviously has significant implications for the 
amount of manpower required at overseas bases. Normally, if the United States wanted to 
conduct an 8-hour ISR mission on North Korea, it would require either a U-2151 or an 
RC-12. Both of these would need to be based in South Korea in order to maximize the 
amount of time they could conduct their ISR mission. Since both of these planes would 
be stationed in an American military base in South Korea, it would require hanger space 
for these aircraft along with maintenance personnel, security personnel, POL storage, and 
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a long runway. In addition to these resources, there would also need to be logistics 
provided for the pilot and his support crew. However, the RQ-4 offers the opportunity to 
reduce most of that infrastructure by having the plane take off from the United States, 
conduct an 8-hour ISR mission, land in Japan to refuel, take off again, conduct another 8-
hour ISR mission, and then return to California for maintenance.  (For a list of United 
States UAVs, see Figure 5 at the end of this chapter.) 
Most countries in the world have come to the conclusion, “Deployed by land, 
naval and air forces, UAVs are seen as an integral part of future force structures, and as 
key means to deliver effect through their employment as ISR assets or as weapons 
platforms.”152  For a list of selected international UAVs see Figure 5 at the end of the 
chapter. 
 UAVs have also been employed against United States overseas bases, introducing 
an interesting twist into the threats that overseas bases now have to take into account. 
According to the New York Times in March 2009, “The American military confirmed on 
Monday that it shot down an Iranian drone over Iraqi territory last month, in what is 
believed to be the first time that has happened.”153  The article went on to list the Iranian 
UAV as an Ababil 3 and that it was equipped, “with video camera and transmission 
equipment, and flown by ground-based pilots.”154 This adds another concern to any 
military contemplating establishing overseas military bases. Previously, it was relatively 
easy to determine whether your base was being observed from the air, but with the 
advances in UAV technology, the future promises to be more complicated. Some 
examples of the newest advances occurring in UAV technology include being able to 
recharge a UAV while it is in the air via laser,155 thus necessitating fewer landings, 
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spoofing a drone to attempt to hijack it,156 or being able to build your own due to the 
rapidly decreasing price of the equipment.157   
 Unmanned vehicles are also expanding into other realms that will reduce the need 
for manned reconnaissance platforms and the overseas bases needed to support them. 
One of the most significant realms is the maritime realm. The oceans are large, and 
attempting to police even a fraction of the area requires massive amount of POL and 
manned ships and planes. However, with some of the recent developments in unmanned 
technology, it is possible that these same objectives will be accomplished with a fraction 
of the manpower and logistical support. One of these unmanned maritime vehicles is 
described below:  
[A] 36 foot robotic motorboat is called the “Spartan Scout,” which the 
Navy has spent some $30 million developing. Guided by a GPS navigation 
system, the boat can be on its own for up to 48 hours, and speed up to 50 
miles per hour. Filled with sensors (including day and night video 
cameras), Spartan Scout is designed to carry out surveillance, patrol 
harbors, and inspect any suspicious ships.158 
 If these new unmanned maritime vehicles are successful, they will enable the 
Navy to accomplish its same objectives with fewer ships. This is actually already 
happening, with Navy Undersecretary Robert Work announcing that the American Navy 
will soon be reduced to less than 300 ships, referencing increase unmanned capabilities as 
one reason. In a speech in April 2012, Navy Undersecretary Work illustrated how these 
new capabilities will replace overseas personnel: “…reduces our land-based posture in 
Europe while increasing forward-stationed naval forces… Calls for innovative, low-cost, 
and small-footprint approaches to achieve security objectives in Africa and Latin 
America.”159 With fewer ships able to perform the same missions this also saves on fuel 
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costs. This reduces the need to store as much POL around the world, which could also 
reduce the need for overseas bases. With fewer ships, it also means fewer foreign port 
calls to refuel and resupply. 
 Unmanned vehicles have also started to play more of a force projection role. The 
most obvious example has been the Predator and Reaper. Before the beginning of the 
21st century, the technology was not available to allow a remotely piloted plane to 
dynamically direct a missile or a bomb to reach a target. However, over the first decade 
of the 21st century, this has happened multiple times in Iraq and Afghanistan.  
 Previously, using an F-16 or A-10 would require a base for the aircraft to take off 
and land from, POL to fuel the plane, and life support facilities for the pilot at the base to 
include food, water, and housing. Additionally, even with all this expenditure, the pilot 
would be limited to only so long in the air waiting for a target before he would have to 
return to base. With a UAV, many of these logistical support requirements are reduced or 
eliminated. A UAV does not need any life support systems after taking off due to most of 
the mission being flown from the United States. This reduces the space on a base required 
for housing, feeding, and associated logistical support. Additionally, UAVs are able to 
loiter in the air for up to 20 hours waiting for a target on less fuel than an equivalent 
manned platform. This provides longer capabilities and less POL that needs to be 
supplied at an overseas base. With new and developing force projection capabilities, 
UAVs are accomplishing the same force projection objectives as manned aircraft, but 
with fewer military personnel and associated overseas equipment. 
 The strategic implications of these developments are that the United States and 
other countries will rely more on unmanned vehicles to conduct overseas operations. This 
strategic trend began with the use of Predators in Pakistan and has spread to other areas 
of operations. An example of this new strategic type of warfare would be the operations 
occurring in Somalia and Yemen. In June, the White House announced that the United 
States has been conducting military operations in these two areas, 
In Somalia, the U.S. military has worked to counter the terrorist threat 
posed by al-Qa’ida and al-Qa’ida-associated elements of al-Shabaab. In a 
limited number of cases, the U.S. military has taken direct action in 
Somalia against members of al-Qa’ida… The U.S. military has also been 
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working closely with the Yemeni government… Our joint efforts have 
resulted in direct action against a limited number of AQAP operatives and 
senior leaders in that country.160 
 While there was no specific mention of unmanned vehicles in these attacks, many 
different news sources assessed that unmanned vehicles were the platform being used to 
carry out these military strikes. “The report does not elaborate, but ‘direct action’ is a 
military term of art that refers to a range of lethal attacks, which in the case of Yemen 
and Somalia include attacks by armed drones.”161  These two operations combine with 
other reports162 that show the dramatic increase in drone strikes in areas that previously 
would have required military ground forces or an air campaign to accomplish the same 
objectives. By shifting to unmanned vehicles to collect intelligence and strike targets, it 
has substantially reduced the need for large overseas bases. Instead, the only forward 
deployed assets required are Predators and Reapers and their support staff. Alternatively, 
these assets, with their long loiter time and slow fuel consumption, could be launched out 
of bases that are already established in the area, such as Djibouti.   
F. POST-RMA – CYBERSPACE CAPABILITIES 
Cyberspace represents another significant change in intelligence collection, 
reducing uncertainty and shrinking the footprint of reconnaissance overseas. Also, tools 
being developed in cyberspace are beginning to play a force projection role. This section 
begins by looking at cyber space and the capabilities that cyber espionage and cyber 
reconnaissance have demonstrated. After examining the impact cyber reconnaissance has 
for states and militaries to acquire intelligence, the section moves on to explore how 
cyber attack capabilities can accomplish the same objectives that were previously 
possible only with kinetic strikes. The goal is to demonstrate how cyber capabilities are 
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reducing the intelligence and force projection footprint overseas by reducing the amount 
of manpower and manned platforms required to accomplish the same objectives.   
The United States military has recognized that cyberspace has become “a 
warfighting domain”163 similar to the ocean, land, air, and space. This has led to strategic 
changes in the way the United States military conducts operations and is organized. The 
best example of this is the Department of Defense standing up the Cyber Command 
organization in May 2010 with the mission to:  
Direct the operations and defense of specified Department of Defense 
information networks and; prepare to, and when directed, conduct full-
spectrum military cyberspace operations in order to enable actions in all 
domains, ensure U.S./Allied freedom of action in cyberspace and deny the 
same to our adversaries.164 
 The creation of Cyber Command has also led to the creation of new military 
career fields that focus on offensive and defensive operations in cyberspace. Along with 
the creation of these new career fields has been the creation of advanced technical 
training courses to ensure military members have the latest information available. The 
importance of cyberspace and how it can affect traditional military operations was 
explained by the commander of U.S. STRATCOM Air Force Gen Kevin Chilton: 
It’s not a convenience any more, it’s a dependency. We need to recognize 
that we need this domain and we need these systems to conduct our fight 
today and tomorrow. We need to recognize that we can fight in this 
domain just as an air-to-air fighter can fight in the air domain; and we can 
fight through this domain and affect other domains just as an airplane can 
drop a bomb on a land domain and create affects across a domain.165 
This move by the United States has led other countries, both friends and foe, to 
begin to build their own military cyber forces. “Christian Le Miere, senior Asia analyst 
for Jane’s Country Risk, said: ‘Every major military has to be concerned about cyber war. 
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There was maybe some form of taboo [about setting up a dedicated centre], but as soon 
as the U.S. does it, everyone says ‘we can have one too’.’”166 Both the United Kingdom 
and South Korea have created their own cyber military forces.167  China also unveiled 
its own cyber command in July 2010. “The establishment of the “Information Security 
Base” (xinxi baozhang jidi), which is headquartered under the PLA General Staff 
Department, may serve as the PLA’s cyber command. The ‘base’ is reportedly tasked 
with the mission to address potential cyber threats and to safeguard China’s national 
security.”168 
 Finally, even countries without significant Internet capabilities have decided it is 
important to establish a cyber capability. A perfect example of this is North Korea. North 
Korean defector Kim Heung-kwang told a conference about the extent of North Korean 
cyber units in 2011:  “North Korea last year raised the status of its cyber warfare unit 
under the Reconnaissance General Bureau and increased the number of troops in the unit 
from 500 to about 3,000.”169  Some analysts have speculated that North Korea might 
begin to shift away from conventional attacks on South Korea and move to cyber attacks, 
which are more difficult to attribute and less likely to result in a conventional South 
Korean military retaliation.170  
 With states and militaries shifting more information online, cyberspace has 
evolved as an area to gain valuable intelligence about an adversary nation or military. 
Militaries value efficiency, especially concerning the ability to disseminate information 
both up and down the chain of command. As computers and the Internet have become 
more ubiquitous, militaries have migrated more and more of their data online to ensure 
the ability of rapid dissemination and collaboration. At the same time, many militaries 
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have recognized the importance of keeping more sensitive information off the regular 
Internet and established separate networks like SIPRNET and JWICS. However, even 
with these steps, there are still many opportunities for an adversary to discover useful 
intelligence.   
 There are two primary ways for a military to be most effective at conducting 
cyber reconnaissance and espionage. The first way is to create a group of individuals 
whose focus is to penetrate a foreign military network and gain specific information. This 
is called an Advanced Persistent Threat or APT. “APTs have a level of planning that sets 
them apart from other cyber threats. Like the plots in the ‘Ocean’s’ movies, they are the 
work of a team that combines organization, intelligence, complexity and patience.”171  
P.W. Singer describes the attributes that distinguish an APT from normal hacking: 
Such a team eschews the usual criminal ethic of “grab what you can get” 
in favor of a disciplined pursuit of specific files. In many cases, the 
attackers don’t even open the files during a theft, suggesting that their 
earlier reconnaissance was thorough enough that they didn’t need to 
double-check. Many analysts believe this discipline suggests the hidden 
hand of military or intelligence officials, either as team members or 
advisers, in many APTs.172 
 Although usually very difficult to observe, some of these have been reported in 
the open press. “These events, known to the public under such names as Moonlight 
Maze, which may be linked to Russia, Titan Rain, which may involve China,”173 and 
Olympic Games, which might be linked to the United States.174   
 The second way for a military to conduct cyber reconnaissance and espionage is 
to develop a program that automates the spying and exfiltration of data. One of the most 
reported intrusions representing this type of cyber reconnaissance was with a program 
called Agent.btz. According to Deputy Secretary of Defense Lynn in 2010, “It began 
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when an infected flash drive was inserted into a U.S. military laptop at a base in the 
Middle East. The flash drive’s malicious computer code, placed there by a foreign 
intelligence agency, uploaded itself onto a network run by the U.S. Central 
Command.”175  Lately, increasingly sophisticated computer programs have been 
reported. These include Duqu, “a reconnaissance tool that researchers say was used to 
copy blueprints of Iran’s nuclear program,”176 and the larger and more sophisticated 
Flame virus.177  
Militaries that utilize these new cyber reconnaissance and espionage techniques 
can gain the ability to collect intelligence that was previously unattainable or required 
massive amounts of intelligence collection. Cyber reconnaissance reduces the need for 
traditional reconnaissance in three ways: obtaining technical information on aircrafts or 
ships that was previously only available by observation, monitoring macro level troop 
and unit movements, and better ability to locate adversaries in a wartime environment. 
This helps reduce the need for overseas bases in two different ways. By gaining access to 
increased information about an adversary a country can reduce the “fog of war.”  By 
reducing the uncertainty about overseas locations, it can reduce the amount of forces 
needed to defend the location to a minimum necessary for routine security. Second, a 
military is able to gain this information without having to expend resources and 
manpower outside of the home country. Instead, this intelligence gathering was 
accomplished by military personnel operating from inside their home country.    
 Following are some examples that illustrate how force projection via cyber 
methods can reduce the requirements for military forces overseas by accomplishing the 
same objective. The first example would be the 2008 War between Russia and Georgia. 
Assume the military objective is to disable the Georgian government from being able to 
communicate with its population and the outside world. Before cyber war, this objective 
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would need to be accomplished with either saboteurs, fighter jets launching kinetic 
strikes, or jamming. This would probably require multiple missions to target and destroy 
this equipment. However, with cyber capabilities, this can be done online with forces still 
stationed in their home country:  
Botnets played a key role during the 2008 Russia–Georgia war, serving 
Moscow as a strategic multiplier for its military campaign through 
distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks. Commercial-grade botnets 
originating from Russian cyberspace silenced Georgian government 
websites and independent media, and disabled the government’s ability to 
communicate to its population.178 
 Another example would be the ability to prevent an adversary air force from 
participating in a conflict. Before cyber capabilities, this would have involved shooting 
down the planes in the air or bombing them on the ground. With cyber, however, there is 
now another way to accomplish the same objective: introduce malware into the enemy’s 
aircraft, preventing the acquisition of the information necessary to fight. This scenario 
actually occurred to the French in 2009. “The aircraft were unable to download their 
flight plans after databases were infected by a Microsoft virus they had already been 
warned about several months beforehand.”179  Essentially, the Conficker virus 
accomplished the same objective, grounding French Air Force planes that in the past 
would have required more conventional methods. In fact, the virus did more than just 
attack the planes; it also significantly impacted the French military’s communications 
apparatus.  “The French navy admitted that during the time it took to eradicate the virus, 
it had to return to more traditional forms of communication: telephone, fax and post.”180 
  A final example of force projection from the Internet is the Stuxnet computer 
virus. Stuxnet was a virus that penetrated into Iranian nuclear processing complexes and 
destroyed centrifuges being used for nuclear enrichment. The New York Times reported 
that it provided an example of an objective that used to require kinetic action 
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accomplished via cyber actions: “It appears to be the first time the United States has 
repeatedly used cyber weapons to cripple another country’s infrastructure, achieving, 
with computer code, what until then could be accomplished only by bombing a country 
or sending in agents to plant explosives.”181   
 Commentators have pointed to how this type of attack is much more cost effective 
than more conventional methods of achieving the same objective: “It is unclear how 
much the Stuxnet program cost, but it was almost certainly less than the cost of single 
fighter-bomber.”182  Others have made direct comparisons to modern military weapons: 
“German expert Ralph Lagner describes Stuxnet as a military-grade cyber missile that 
was used to launch an ‘all-out cyber strike against the Iranian nuclear program.’”183  
Stuxnet also showed how a cyber weapon could be more effective than a traditional 
bombing attack since it has the capability to find centrifuges that might have been 
undetected from a conventional attack.  “The key to the Stuxnet worm is that it can attack 
both known and unknown centrifuges.”184  Cyber weapons like Stuxnet give countries 
the ability to strike an adversary that is located anywhere in world. Previously, a strike on 
Iran would have required military forces, including planes based in the Middle East. 
However, with cyber weapons, these same attack objectives can be accomplished from 
the United States with no need to deploy military forces to overseas military bases. 
G. CONCLUSION 
The revolution in military affairs has completely changed the nature of warfare 
and made large overseas military bases less important in future conflicts and force 
projection. Satellite imagery, open source reporting, and cyber reconnaissance will allow 
states to determine possible adversary hostile intent in a more timely and accurate 
fashion. This enhanced intelligence collection will lead to less surprises on the battlefield 
and more flexible deployment of forces before a conflict occurs. Additionally, unmanned 
vehicles could become a deciding factor in a future conflict. As shown in Yemen and 
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Somalia, unmanned vehicles provide a force multiplier that results in fewer troops and 
smaller footprints overseas to accomplish the same objectives that required larger 
military bases.    
Just as significant, militaries have come to rely more on satellite capabilities like 
GPS and cyber capabilities like the Internet.   The first shots of a future war will probably 
involve each side attempting to take control of these assets and denying their adversary 
the opportunity to utilize them. If one state in a conflict can gain control of space and 
cyberspace the other side will be at a significant disadvantage in a following conflict. 
This is one of the reasons that China and Russia are building their own GPS system and 
launching their own satellites. The losing side would see its overseas military bases 
reduced to insignificant factors due to their limited information, communications, and 
logistics support. These overseas bases would thus not play a significant role in the 
broader strategic conflict. China may well have reached this conclusion, and could 
plausibly have decided that overseas military bases are not worth the financial investment 
if they will not play a significant role in a future conflict with India or the United States. 





Figure 5.   DoD Unmanned Aerial System Platforms185 
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Figure 6.   Worldwide Unmanned Aerial System186 (continued on next page) 
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IV. SUPPORTING CASE STUDIES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter I will use a methodology that involves an analysis of three 
comparative case studies in order to answer my research question: “Are modern overseas 
military bases an outdated military concept?”  The three comparative case studies will 
involve states that decided to reduce their international military presence during the last 
twenty years. The first case study involves the United States reducing its military forces 
stationed in South Korea. The reason the United States is reducing its forces is that due to 
the Revolution in Military Affairs it can accomplish more capabilities with less people. 
One of the most important aspects of this is with increased imagery from satellites 
providing better intelligence, GPS enabling more accurate force deployment and 
targeting, and open source intelligence allowing better collection. At the same time North 
Korea is trying to counter the United States satellite advantage by jamming GPS and 
regionally denying the United States the ability to access space. North Korea is also 
trying to counter the United States asymmetrically by creating cyber military units to 
attack South Korea and the United States.    
The second case study involves the British force reduction in the Falkland Islands 
since 1982. An important point to remember is that the British are not protecting the 
Falkland Islands for its military usefulness; instead they are stationing military forces 
there to allow the British citizens the right to self-determination. If there were no British 
citizens on the Falklands, the British would probably have transferred ownership back to 
Argentina decades ago. However, Britain has been able to reduce its military footprint 
due to increases in intelligence capabilities provided by satellites and open source 
intelligence. Additionally by building RAF Mount Pleasant it has allowed the British to 
turn the Falkland Islands into a military place as opposed to a military base. Hence the 
British can station a minimum numbers of troops on the island and rapidly call in 
reinforcements in case tensions escalate. 
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The third case involved Israel’s occupation of Southern Lebanon. This case 
illustrates the limitations of the Revolution in Military Affairs when a state confronts 
non-traditional military objectives like population pacification and an insurgency. As 
important, this case also illustrates some of the complicating factors that can occur when 
a country tries to establish a significant military presence outside of its country’s borders. 
The Israel’s solve their dilemma by withdrawing from southern Lebanon and creating 
new technology that can accomplish the same military objectives without a foreign 
military presence. All of these cases illustrate that large foreign military bases are rapidly 
losing their utility and are becoming outdated. 
All three of these case studies share important similarities with each other, and 
with China. First, all of these states are powerful regional or international powers. The 
United States can be termed an international power, while the United Kingdom, Israel, 
and China are important regional powers. For each case study, the decision to reduce 
troops was a unilateral decision made by the respective country. Troops were not reduced 
due to international pressure, a substantial change in budgetary pressure, or a dramatic 
change in the military threat. Each state initially sent troops into each area for a very 
specific purpose that remained the same during the entire time frame. In the United States 
example this was to protect South Korea and deter North Korean military action. In the 
United Kingdom example this was to protect the Falkland Islands from invasion. In the 
Israel example the reason for the occupation was to limit attacks on Israel from Lebanon. 
For each of these cases the decision to reduce troops or withdraw from the area was based 
on the revolution in military affairs and new technology allowing the same objective to 
be achieved with fewer personnel. 
B. UNITED STATES FORCE REDUCTION IN SOUTH KOREA – 
ACCOMPLISHING MORE WITH LESS PEOPLE 
 The first case study will examine the United States reduction in troops and 
consolidation of bases in South Korea during the time period 2000–2012. This case study 
will begin with a brief synopsis of United States involvement in South Korea. This will 
be followed by a description of the reduction in forces and bases that occurred during the 
last 12 years. With the facts established, the next step will be to refute alternative 
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hypothesizes for the reason the reduction occurred.   These confounding variables 
include: a reduction in the North Korean threat, United States budget austerity, and the 
Global War on Terror. With these confounding variables undermined the following 
section will present evidence for my theory that the reduction in forces was due to the 
Revolution in Military Affairs and the conclusion that the same objectives of intelligence, 
force projection, and logistics could be accomplished in support of the mission with 
significantly fewer forces. 
  The United States occupied South Korea with the end of World War II, 
“American forces partitioned the peninsula at the end of World War II, established the 
ROK as a new nation in 1948, rescued South Korea from invasion in 1950, and deployed 
as a permanent garrison after the conflict ended in 1953. U.S. troops remain to this 
day.”187  After this time period there were two significant reductions in United States 
troops in South Korea. One occurred in 1971 under the Nixon Doctrine which 
encouraged the United States allies to become more self-reliant. During the time United 
States troops were reduced from 63,000 to 43,000.188  The next significant reduction 
occurred with the end of the Cold War when President George Bush withdrew an 
additional 5,000 troops in 1992.189  Hence during the previous thirty years before 2000 
there had only been two significant reductions in forces. The second troop reduction that 
occurred involved only 5000 troops out of a total of 43,000. Additionally both of these 
reductions had occurred towards the end of significant conflicts – the Vietnam War and 
the end of the Cold War. 
Then in 2004, the United States announced that it was planning to withdraw 
12,000 troops from Korea in the next few years:  
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld authorized a realignment program 
to reduce and relocate U.S. forces in South Korea. Under the Rumsfeld 
program, the Pentagon withdrew a 3,600-person combat brigade from the 
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Second Division and sent it to Iraq. The Rumsfeld plan called for the U.S. 
troop level in South Korea to fall from 37,000 to 25,000 by September 
2008.190 
Members of both the South Korean and United States military made sure to 
emphasize that this reduction in force did not equate to a reduction in capabilities, “The 
Secretary and the Minister expressed their shared commitment to ensure that the 
redeployment would not weaken the combined deterrent and defensive capabilities of the 
Alliance and warned that for anyone to perceive such a weakening would be a 
mistake.”191 
From 2005 till 2008 reductions in troops and bases did occur; however, instead of 
reducing the amount of troops by 12,000 to 25,000 the troop reductions were halted in 
2008 by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates leaving 28,500 troops still in South Korea.192  
Even with this smaller change, the end result was a reduction of 8,500 troops, which still 
represented the largest reduction in forces since 1971. Additionally a number of bases 
close to the Demilitarized Zone were closed in 2005 and 2006 including Camp Essayons, 
Camp Falling Water, Camp Jackson, Camp Kwangsari, Camp Kyle, Camp LaGuardia, 
Camp Page, and Camp Sears.193  Although the reduction and consolidation plan has been 
delayed the trend of reduction in bases continues through the present day. This reduction 
in bases is apparent when examining the USFK Strategic Alliance 2015 document that 
was announced in 2010.194 
                                                 
190 Mark E. Manyin, “U.S.-South Korea Relations,” CRS, Nov. 3, 2010, 
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/152040.pdf. 
191 “Joint Communiqué: Thirty-Sixth Annual U.S.-ROK Security Consultative Meeting,” Department 
of Defense, Oct. 2004, http://www.defense.gov/news/Oct2004/d20041022joint.pdf. 
192 Manyin, “U.S.-South Korea Relations.” 
193 “U.S. Forces Korea Facilities,” Global Security website, May 7, 2011, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/korea.htm. 
194 General Walter L. Sharp, “USFK Press Conference Transcript,” United State Forces Korea 
(USFK), Sept. 9, 2010, http://www.usfk.mil/usfk/speech.press.conference.transcript.497. 
 71 
   
Figure 7.   U.S. Base Consolidation Plan in South Korea195 
It is important to note that this base reduction continues despite North Korean 
military actions like the sinking of the Cheonan and shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in 
2010. These two incidents represent the most aggressive military action North Korea has 
taken in the last 20 years.196 
 The next step will be to refute alternative hypothesizes for the reason the troop 
and base reduction occurred.   These confounding variables include: a reduction in the 
North Korean threat, United States budget austerity, and the Global War on Terror. It is 
important to establish that the reduction in forces and closure of overseas military bases 
was a unilateral decision made by the United States because of technical advances in 
military warfare as opposed to some other factor.    
 The first alternative hypothesis is that the United States is reducing its forces 
because North Korea is no longer as significant a threat as it was during the 1980s and 
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1990s. However, this would be incorrect. In fact, there is ample evidence to indicate that 
since 2000 North Korea has maintained or become more of a threat to South Korea and 
the United States. One important change that has occurred is that over the previous two 
decades North Korea had moved more of its million man army closer to the DMZ:  
In particular, the percentage of North Korean forces deployed within 
100km of the DMZ has significantly increased during the past two 
decades. Currently, North Korea deploys approximately 65% of its 
military units, and up to 80% of its estimated aggregate firepower, within 
100km of the DMZ. This inventory includes approximately 700,000 
troops, 8,000 artillery systems and 2,000 tanks.197 
 Other important improvements in North Korean capabilities were displayed in a 
military parade in November 2010. These include the likely acquisition of Chinese-made 
ZM-87 anti-personnel lasers which are banned by the United Nations198 and new air 
defense weapons, “Jane’s concluded that it represented ‘a major expansion in North 
Korea’s air defense potential,’ with a radar/guidance system that would be harder to 
jam.”199  In addition to the new conventional weapons, North Korea has also shown more 
aggressive military action with the March 2010 sinking of the South Korean naval vessel 
the Cheonan and the November 2010 shelling of Yeonpyeong Island.200 
 More important than the conventional capabilities that the North Koreans have 
developed are the asymmetric capabilities like GPS jamming and cyber capabilities. Over 
the past two decades North Korea has looked to asymmetric ways as a new strategy to 
counter the United States and South Korean technological advancement. Over the past 
two years North Korean GPS jamming has become an increasing concern. In a military 
exercise in Mar 2011 the United States was forced to cut short a military reconnaissance 
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flight, “A U.S. military reconnaissance aircraft made an emergency landing during annual 
South Korea-U.S. military exercises in March when North Korea jammed its GPS 
device.”201  Another GPS jamming issue happened in 2012 that affected both civilian 
aircraft and ships:  
A total of 553 aircraft on route to and from Incheon and Gimpo, South 
Korea’s two main gateways, reported a failure with their GPS signals 
between April 28 and May 6… More than 120 ships, boats and passenger 
liners off the West Sea, as well as two fishing fleets on the eastern shore, 
also saw their signals jammed.202 
 North Korea is also developing cyber capabilities as it seeks to take advantage of 
the Revolution in Military Affairs and increase its military capabilities in new more 
effective ways. Two Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) targeting South Korea have 
been attributed to North Korea. One cyber attack occurred in July 2009 and the other 
occurred in March 2011. These two incidents affected many different government and 
military facilities, “Government ministries, the National Assembly, the military 
headquarters, U.S. Forces in Korea and major banks were among those hit.”203  North 
Korea is a country that can take full advantage of developing a military strategy around 
cyber war for two reasons – it has limited civilian and military cyber capabilities while its 
opponents are very reliant on the Internet, “With little vulnerability to computer attacks, 
North Korea is free to focus on offense, which has relatively low costs and a potentially 
high impact.”204     
 To conclude this alternative hypothesis, North Korea continues to be a significant 
threat to the United States. Besides moving its conventional forces closer to the DMZ and 
upgrading its air defense capabilities, North Korea is investing in new asymmetric 
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capabilities to win a future conflict. North Korea looks to cyber and space as areas where 
it can take advantage of the lower cost to quickly catch up to the United States and make 
up for its deficit in conventional forces. North Korea sees cyber as a way to expand a 
future battlefield all the way to the United States homeland in ways that are otherwise not 
available via conventional forces.   
 The second alternative hypothesis is that the reduction in forces is due to budget 
constraints imposed on the United States military. This is also incorrect. While budget 
deficits and discussions of curtailing spending have been in the news frequently the 
military budget of the Department of Defense has not had to deal with a reduction in 
spending. As this chart from the Department of Defense shows military spending, 
excluding war funding, has actually increased from $297 billion in 2001 to 
$513 billion in 2009.205   
 
Figure 8.   Department of Defense Topline Budget206 
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 Additionally the Department of Defense budget in 2011 was even more expensive 
than any previous year, “The 2011 U.S. military budget of nearly $700 billion is higher in 
real terms than at any point during the Cold War.”207  If one looks at a comparison to 
other countries the United States is also spending more money for defense than any other 
nation, “The United States invests more in its military manpower and hardware than all 
other countries combined.”208 
The third alternative hypothesis is that the United States needed to shift its 
resources after September 11th, 2001 due to the Global War on Terror. This is also 
incorrect. The seeds of the current South Korean reduction in forces were already being 
planted in 2000:  
A searching review of the American strategy of stationing ground forces 
in Japan and South Korea is underway to see whether those forces can be 
reduced or withdrawn. The United States would rely instead on warships, 
air power, and rapidly deployable ground forces to maintain a military 
presence in Asia. 209 
 The goal of the Department of Defense was to have a plan ready for the next 
president to sign once he assumed office in January 2001. The origins of this reduction in 
forces plan were also referenced in an article in U.S. News and World Report article in 
2012, “it’s because Bush-era defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld proposed similar 
changes-before the 9/11 terrorist attacks. ‘Rumsfeld talked about ‘lily pad bases’ with a 
lighter-weight force spread to more places around the world.’”210  In addition to these 
points, North Korea was also listed as one of the three countries in the Axis of Evil 
making North Korea a primary concern in the War on Terror.  
 With these confounding variables undermined this section will present quotes and 
evidence for my theory that the reduction in forces was due to the Revolution in Military 
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Affairs. The conclusion is that the military objective of securing South Korea can be done 
with significantly fewer forces and bases due to improvements in intelligence, force 
projection, and logistics capability. When Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld unveiled the 
reduction in troops and bases in South Korea he was met with concerns about if this 
would reduce United States capabilities on the Korean peninsula. In an article describing 
the transformation he stated, “We should take advantage of advanced capabilities that 
allow us to do more with less. The old reliance on presence and mass reflects the last 
century’s industrial-age thinking.”211   
 One of the important advancements that have occurred is with satellites. Satellites 
allow increased imagery of North Korea allowing a better intelligence picture of what is 
occurring inside the country. Additionally with the establishment of the GPS system it 
has allowed better accuracy in location information for friendly forces and enemy targets. 
Former Chief of Staff of the Air Force General Schwartz has said, “Besides GPS…the 
Air Force has come to rely on other information operations provided by space-based 
capabilities, such as imagery and communications satellites, as well as those from single-
purpose aircraft.”212  General Schwartz also recognized that there are vulnerabilities with 
the current space based systems and so is a strong advocate of developing new ideas for 
intelligence collection, “So what we are trying to do at the strategic level is not shackle 
ourselves to applications of our resources that are traditional and comfortable. And think 
more broadly and aggressively on how to make better use of these assets.”213  
 So why is North Korea investing so much money and resources in GPS jammers? 
And why is the United States attempting to come up with alternatives to GPS? The 
reason is that both countries recognize that in a future conflict whoever controls space 
will have a major advantage in a future conflict. North Korea does not have the 
capabilities of China and so cannot try and create its own satellite navigation system. But 
what North Korea can do is try and make the United States GPS and other satellite 
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systems ineffective in a regional setting like the Korean peninsula. The United States has 
recognized that space based systems are a vital component to their military and so are 
trying to find ways to negate North Korea’s jamming capabilities.   
 Open source intelligence is also providing information about Korea that was not 
available to the same extend twenty years ago. While North Korea is still a very closed 
society it has recently shown signs that it cannot maintain the same level of control of 
information that it could a decade ago. A good example is the North Korean failed 
missile launch in 2012. The United States Ambassador to South Korea pointed out that 
the North Korean media announced to its own citizens the failure of the test, which had 
never happened before, “the North took the unusual step of announcing to its citizens a 
couple of months ago, “that the satellite was at the bottom of the Yellow Sea … because 
of the concern that the people would (already) know.”214  If information is able to enter 
North Korea more effectively it also means that information is able to be transmitted out 
of North Korea. In fact cell phone usage, while illegal, has become common place near 
the Chinese border, “Smuggled mobiles have been used on Chinese networks near the 
border for years.”215  North Korea is so concerned about increasing defectors and mobile 
phones that it has declared using a mobile phone a war crime during the 100 day period 
after Kim Jong Il’s death.216 
 When examining force projection it is important to remember that the goal is the 
objective not the number of personnel, “I think the way to think about it is that what 
deters and what gives you the capability to defend are military capabilities. It is not 
numbers of things; it is capability to impose lethal power when needed, where needed, 
with the greatest flexibility and with the greatest agility.”217  One of these changes was 
                                                 
214 Jon Rabiroff, “North Korea struggling to hid information from people, envoy says,” Stars and 
Stripes, Jun. 14, 2012, http://www.stripes.com/news/north-korea-struggling-to-hide-information-from-
people-envoy-says-1.180299. 
215 “Also available to earthlings,” Economist, Feb. 11, 2012, 
http://www.economist.com/node/21547295. 
216 Julian Ryall, “North Korea threatens to punish mobile-phone users as ‘war criminals,’” The 
Telegraph, Jan. 26, 2012, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/northkorea/9040152/North-
Korea-threatens-to-punish-mobile-phone-users-as-war-criminals.html. 
217 Donald Rumsfeld, “Secretary Rumsfeld Korean Joint Press Conference,” Department of Defense, 
Nov. 17, 2003, http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2954. 
 78 
the ability to better defend South Korea from missile attacks with new technology, “the 
United States would deploy by November its most modern air-defense system, the Patriot 
PAC-3, to South Korea.”218  Another component was upgrades to current military 
helicopters, aircraft, and the increased logistics ability to move troops around the world 
quickly. Even in 2011 the idea of new force projection capabilities and a rapidly 
deployable force continues to shape the pressure for reduced overseas bases and troops,. 
As Joseph Parent who has a PhD in Political Science from Columbia University and is a 
professor at the University of Miami explained in Foreign Affairs, “Defending the 
territorial integrity of Japan and South Korea and preventing Chinese or North Korean 
adventurism demands rapid-response forces with strong reserves, not the 30,000 soldiers 
currently stationed in each country.”219  New force projection capabilities include 
expanding into new realms of war, “Our ability to operate effectively in space and 
cyberspace, in particular, is increasingly essential to defeating aggression.”220   
C. BRITISH FORCE REDUCTION IN THE FALKLAND ISLANDS 
The next case study will examine the British reduction in troops on the Falkland 
Islands from 1982 until 2012. The case study will examine the background to the conflict 
in 1982, followed by the reduction in forces, refuting alternative hypothesizes, and then 
present evidence validating my theory. 
 Starting in 1833 the British have maintained a continuous presence on the 
Falkland Islands. However, this presence has been contested by Argentina since the 19th 
century. During the period before 1982 there were various discussions about the status of 
the Falklands but no formal decisions were reached. In 1982 the military junta in charge 
of Argentina decided to launch a “surprise” attack on the Falklands: 
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The Falklands were invaded and illegally occupied by Argentine military 
forces on 2 April 1982. A British task force was dispatched immediately 
and, following a conflict in which over 900 British and Argentine lives 
were lost, the Argentine forces surrendered on 14 June 1982.221 
When Britain organized a task force to retake the Falklands it consisted of 120 
ships including two small aircraft carriers and 43 warships.222  Included in this Task 
Force were 28 Sea Harriers and 14 RAF Harrier GR3s223 and 4,778 personnel on the 
island at the conclusion of the war.224  When the fighting ended the plan was to garrison 
3,100 military personnel on the Falklands in order to ensure security.225 
After the conflict ended in 1982 the British indeed had over 3,000 military 
personnel on the island along with an aircraft carrier with an air wing, multiple 
destroyers, frigates, and other support ships.226  There were plans to improve the 
defensive capabilities of the island, “Soon after the Conflict in 1982, work was started on 
the building of Mount Pleasant Airfield (MPA), 35 miles from Stanley… An airfield 
capable of supporting fighters, helicopters and transport aircraft was constructed and also 
a complex capable of providing for all needs.”227  However, since the late 1980s  the 
British government has reduced its forces on the island which now consists of 1200 
troops, 4 aircraft, 2 ships, and surface to air missiles.228 
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Between 1982 and the present there has been significant reduction in the amount 
of manpower the overall British military employs “a former RAF Wing Commander 
stated in 2011, “When I joined in 1980, the RAF had about 90,000 staff. When I left in 
2006, it was down to 45,000, and now it will be reduced again to about 30,000.”229 
Along with this reduction in manpower Britain also currently does not maintain an 
aircraft carrier as it is waiting for two new aircraft carriers to be built.   
 Thus, one alternative hypothesis for the reduction in the amount of manpower on 
the island is due to reductions in Britain’s military budget and austerity. While cuts in 
defense have occurred over the past twenty years, Britain was also grappling with defense 
cuts before the Falklands incident happened in 1982. One example was the 
“announcement that the ice patrol ship HMS Endurance, the Royal Navy’s last presence 
in the South Atlantic, would be decommissioned the following year [1982] and not be 
replaced.”230  The other piece of evidence is that the Thatcher government had also 
attempted to sell the HMS Invincible in 1981, “In a Whitehall in 1981 deep in the throes 
of cutting defense expenditures (ironically, the Argentine Navy had been offered the new 
carrier HMS Invincible at a knock down price in 1981…) any policy advocating extra 
military spending “out of area” equated to lunacy.”231 
 Additional the cuts to defense have to be placed in the proper context as Britain 
still has the 4th largest defense budget in the world behind only the United States, China, 
and Russia, “The defence budget will rise in cash terms. It will meet the NATO 2% target 
throughout the next four years. We expect to continue with the fourth largest military 
budget in the world.”232  In fact, Britain still spends $62.7 million dollars a year or 
roughly 2.6% of its GDP.233  The United Kingdom has spent roughly 2.6% of GDP on 
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military defense since 1997.234  Indeed the government has proclaimed that budget will 
not impact the capabilities of the United Kingdom to protect itself and its overseas 
territories, “we have been clear that savings will not be made at the expense of our core 
security: national security budgets have been given relative protection in the Spending 
Review.”235  Hence if personnel are being cut, its not due to the budget reductions but 
instead because large amounts of personnel have been deemed no longer necessary to 
accomplish Britain’s objectives and a similar amount of defense GDP could be better 
spend on other military capabilities. 
 The second alternative hypothesis is that there has been a reduction in the 
invasion threat to the Falklands. This is also debatable. Up until a few months before the 
Argentine invasion of the Falklands in 1982 no one in the British government, or most of 
the world, expected an invasion to occur. According to one British historian the original 
invasion planning by the Argentinean military occurred in December 1981 and was 
briefed to the Argentine military leadership in January 1982, or only about 2 months 
before the invasion actually happened.236  Additionally recently tensions between the 
United Kingdom and Argentina have risen due to the 30th anniversary of the Falkland 
War, political instability in Argentina, and Falklands allowing hydrocarbon exploration in 
its territorial waters.237  Over the last year the president of Argentina, Cristina Kirchner, 
has been running into economic trouble which threatens her popularity. In order to find 
new sources of revenue she has nationalized a Spanish oil company and increasingly tried 
to distract the Argentina public by focusing on the Falkland Islands.238  If economic 
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circumstances in Argentina continue to deteriorate and oil is discovered around the 
Falkland Islands it could lead to similar disputes that are occurring in the South China 
Sea.     
 My theory is that the reduction in military forces was due to the Revolution in 
Military Affairs and the conclusion that the same objectives of intelligence, force 
projection, and logistics could be accomplished in support of the with significantly fewer 
forces. Increased intelligence capabilities, better force projection, and logistics have 
transformed the Falklands from a military base to more of a military node, or place.   
 Starting with intelligence it is important to compare the capabilities that were 
available in 1982 to the capabilities that the British have available now. Concerning 
intelligence in 1982, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher has publicly stated, “Contrary to 
what was said at the time…we had no intelligence until almost the last moment that 
Argentina was about to launch a full-scale invasion.”239  Other sources have also talked 
about how, “The intelligence was poor; preparations non-existent.”240  Retired Colonel 
John Hughes-Wilson, who served 31 years in the British Army with 20 spent in British 
Intelligence, focuses on what the specific intelligence failures were, “Cognitive 
dissonance in the British civil service and government in 1982 was a major cause of the 
Falklands War. The British ignored the many intelligence warning because they did not 
accord with what the British wanted to happen.”241  Part of the problem was that in the 
early 1980s Britain had very few intelligence capabilities in the Southern Atlantic, “In 
fact there were just two key intelligence officers in place.”242  Hence when jingoistic 
comments were made in the Argentine press there was no capabilities that could be used 
to validate whether they were legitimate or not, “An article in the Argentine press in 
January 1982 claimed that, ‘If the next round of negotiations with London fails, Buenos 
Aires will take over the islands by force this year.’…The British FCO dismissed such 
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behavior as Latin exuberance.”243 Thus, “lacking good intelligence resources inside 
Argentina the British were fatally blind to both Argentinean capabilities and 
intentions.”244  
 One of the major differences today is that the British have realized the importance 
of maintaining good intelligence capabilities and collection around the world. As the 
British Chief of the Defense Staff has said concerning Libya, “The bedrock of successful 
combat capabilities is Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance. 
This allows us to understand, track, strike and remain poised to react to the 
unexpected.”245  One of these improvements has been to expand Britain’s intelligence 
capabilities – such as gaining access to satellite imagery. Looking at the Falklands 30 
years ago, “Intelligence in those days [1982] was hopeless,” says Prof Sir Lawrence 
Freedman, official historian of the Falklands War. “There was no access to satellites at 
the time of invasion. People didn’t know what was going on.”246  This is dramatically 
different to today when Britain does have access to satellite imagery and the Internet 
allows quick dissemination of information. According to Professor Freedman, official 
historian of the Falklands War, in an article by the BBC, “Nowadays the UK has access 
to satellites that would show a massing of Argentine forces. Islanders have the Internet, 
which would make it easier to get word back that the islands are under attack.”247   
 Another intelligence capability that has been added to the Falklands is the 
additional of SIGINT platforms to monitor electronic communications in the area, “the 
electronic monitoring that now takes place from Mount Pleasant itself is, in orders of 
magnitude, greater than existed in 1982.”248  The 81st Signal Squadron usually deploys to 
the Falklands and recently has upgraded the communications capabilities, “These have 
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included major frame changes and cable replacements and more recently the installation of 
long distance fibre optic runs.”249    
The second significant change that has occurred since 1982 that has allowed the 
reduction in troops is the addition of different force projection and logistical capabilities 
on the Falkland Islands and in the British military. The most important change is the 
addition of Mount Pleasant military airfield:  
The military balance around the Falklands has been transformed by the 
construction since 1982 of the Mount Pleasant airbase 30 miles outside 
Stanley, which replaced the small airstrip that existed at that time.  Mount 
Pleasant is a major military facility with two runways of over 4,000 meters 
between them. It will take military aircraft of all types and as such is a 
critical military asset that transforms the “can we defend/re-take The 
Falklands?” equation into a simple military fact: whoever controls Mount 
Pleasant controls the Islands.250 
Other commentators have also remarked that the addition of the airfield means 
that the defense of the island is no longer measured in the amount of troops stationed 
there, “Military experts believe the islands are now virtually impregnable. The new air 
base has completely altered the balance of power.”251  The addition of the air field has 
essentially changed the nature of the Falkland Islands from a military base to a military 
place. While there are a small number of military personnel and aircraft that serve as a 
deterrence force, the primary nature of the defense of the islands depends on rapid 
reinforcement.   
One of the most important force projection capabilities that the airfield provides is 
the ability to quickly supply reinforcements in the event of deteriorating political or 
military conditions with Argentina. The Royal United Services Institute, an independent 
British think tank established in 1831 has said, “Most significantly, the base could be 
reinforced by air within 18 hours if the need arose.”252  With this capability the defense 
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of the Falklands has shifted from a question of how many troops are on the island and 
how many ships are patrolling the surrounding waters to a matter of who controls the 
skies around the island, “The nature of the task has changed from essentially a Royal 
Navy commitment to the defence of The Falklands to an RAF commitment.”253  Along 
with newer aircraft and air refueling capability even if Britain were to lose the Mount 
Pleasant military airfield or it were to become incapacitated there are still other military 
force projection options available, “Much has changed in strategic terms. Nowadays, it 
could be won back through long-range air power, says Professor Michael Clarke, director 
of the Royal United Services Institute.” 254 
Another important point to make is that the primary reason the British want to 
protect the Falkland Islands is not military, “the British wanted neither the colony nor the 
ownership, but were stuck with the indignant islanders.”255  The British do not see any 
military value to the Falkland Islands and before the Argentina invasion were thinking of 
giving the island back to Argentina and then leasing it for 99 years.256  However, before 
1982 the British were unable to accomplish this because the islanders had the right of 
self-determination as promised in the United Nations Charter under Article 73. After the 
1982 conflict, islander self-determination and British nationalism have been the primary 
motives for continuing to have this overseas military base. If the British were deciding 
today whether to establish a military base and colonist on the Falkland Islands, they 
would probably decide against it. Hence if China is deciding to establish a military base 
today they do not have to worry about native Chinese populations demanding a 
continuation of historical protection. 
In conclusion, the evidence presented supports my theory that the reduction in 
forces was due to the Revolution in Military Affairs and the conclusion that the same 
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objectives of intelligence, force projection, and logistics could be accomplished in 
support of the mission, to protect the Falklands from invasion, with significantly fewer 
military forces. 
D. ISRAELI FORCE REDUCTION IN SOUTHERN LEBANON 
The final case study will examine Israel’s decision to withdraw troops from 
Southern Lebanon in 2000. The case study will look will examine the situation in two 
periods: 1982–2000 and post-2000. Then alternate hypothesizes will be addressed and 
finally the evidence for my thesis that the reduction in forces was due to the Revolution 
in Military Affairs. This case study will look at the limitations of new technology when 
confronting non-traditional military objectives, like pacification, and asymmetric para-
military forces, like an insurgency, in a foreign land. The case study will ultimately 
identify additional complications of setting up military bases in a foreign land and how 
these complications can be mitigated by developing new capabilities that can accomplish 
the same objectives from a country’s home territory. 
In 1982 Israel invaded southern Lebanon. The primary objective of Israel’s 
invasion was to protect northern Israel from rocket attacks and cross border raids by the 
PLO. In 1985, “The forces gradually withdrew to a self-declared nine-mile ‘security 
zone,’ north of the Israeli border.”257  While this resulted in an immediate reduction in 
attacks on northern Israel the intended effect did not last long. Instead attacks were 
redirected against the Israeli military forces that remained in Southern Lebanon, “the 
‘guerilla fighters’ main aim was to end the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon. Each 
year they killed dozens of Israeli soldiers. Finally, the human price of the war became too 
high.”258   
In May 2000 Israel unilaterally decided to withdraw all of its forces from southern 
Lebanon. Israel had left the South Lebanon Army (SLA) in southern Lebanon with the 
hope that it would be able to negotiate with the Lebanese government and maintain a 
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stable friendly presence next to northern Israel. However, this did not happen and the 
SLA collapsed almost immediately with Hezbollah taking over southern Lebanon to the 
discomfort of Israel. However, Hezbollah’s domination of southern Lebanon did not 
result in the renewal of large amount of cross border raids or rocket attacks that some had 
predicated. This relative peace lasted until July 12, 2006 when Hezbollah kidnapped two 
Israeli soldiers and, “provoked Israel to launch a war against Hezbollah in Lebanon. The 
war ended with a cessation of hostilities on August 14. Israeli forces withdrew as their 
positions were assumed by the Lebanese army and an enlarged U.N. Interim Forces in 
Lebanon (UNIFIL).”259  Since 2006, besides low levels of violence, there has been 
relative peace along the Israel and Lebanon frontier, “As a result, since the middle of 
August 2006, all over southern Lebanon hardly a shot has been fired.”260 
Two alternative hypotheses can be presented for why Israel decided to withdraw 
its forces from foreign territory in Lebanon. The first alternative explanation is that Israel 
had accomplished its objectives. The idea behind this explanation is that Israel had 
originally established the security zone to ensure that its northern territory was protected. 
Over the 15 years this objective was accomplished so Israel decided to retreat expecting 
the SLA to continue the job it had been trained to do. However, this would be incorrect 
for three reasons: instead of rocket attacks on civilians the violence switched to Israeli 
troops, Israel continued to have rocket attacks, and the foreign occupation created an anti-
Israel group that was more radical than the one that Israel had originally invaded Lebanon 
to crush.   
The primary purpose of the 1982 invasion and subsequent occupation was to 
protect northern Israel. By protecting northern Israel the goal was to ensure that the 
civilian population would not be harmed or killed. While this was successful to a degree 
the problem became that Israel troops were being killed at a similar or greater rate than 
the rocket attacks that had warranted the invasion. Hence if the objective was to protect 
Israel lives trading civilian lives for military lives in a conflict that never seemed as if it 
was going to end was not accomplishing the goal, “Did the occupation enhance security?  
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Hardly at all. The Israeli forces and the SLA suffered a steady flow of casualties over the 
years.”261  Part of the problem is that the rate of causalities on the Israeli side did not 
improve during the course of the occupation – on the contrary Israel actually started to 
lose more people proportionally to Hezbollah as the conflict progressed:  
In marked contrast to the late 1980s, when its attacks often involved large 
losses, the ratio of Hizballah casualties to IDF/SLA casualties dropped 
from more than 5:1 in 1995 to less than 2:1. Suicide bombers were 
superseded by coordinated military attacks that benefited from excellent 
planning and intelligence…Most of the seven Israeli soldiers felled during 
January and February [2000] of this year were killed by TOWs.262 
These Israeli military deaths in the later stages of the conflict effected all ranks, 
“The killing of seven Israeli soldiers in late February and early March, including a 
brigadier general (the highest ranking Israeli killed in Lebanon since 1982), has furthered 
the call in Israel to get out.”263  The RMA was not effective in southern Lebanon because 
Israel was not fighting a traditional conflict and instead was confronting an insurgency. 
With a traditional state conflict the objectives are usually land or resources. The enemy 
typically wears uniforms and has military equipment, like tanks, which are easy to 
identify. In these traditional conflicts the RMA is able to achieve a force multiplier effect 
and significantly enhance the capabilities of smaller forces. However, in an insurgency, 
like Iraq after the 2003 invasion, the enemy forces are not easy to identify and the 
objective is not territory but pacification. In this case, insurgency is able to negate the 
advantages of the Revolution in Military Affairs by utilizing the aspects of stealth, 
decentralized execution, and utilizing urban environments to the insurgents’ advantage. 
When debating the question of whether China would establish a “string of pearls” 
the important point to keep in mind is that China would be creating these overseas 
military bases to confront traditional military threats. China would not be establishing 
overseas military bases to deal with insurgencies or to try and bring democracy to an 
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area. Hence in a China case the Revolution in Military Affairs would still provide the 
force multiplier effect seen in the United States example above. 
Even with the Israel occupation of southern Lebanon not all rocket attacks on 
Israel were prevented, “in April 1996, following Israel’s Grapes of Wrath operation, 
during which the resistance fired more than 600 Katyushas into Israel”264 The fact that 
Hezbollah was still able to mount large scale rocket barrages after more than 10 years of 
Israel occupation made many people wonder if anything had been accomplished. This 
became more of an issue as Hezbollah appeared to be gaining the edge, “According to the 
IDF, Hezbollah mortar attacks doubled to 1,100 last year.[1998]”265 
The second alternative hypothesis is that Israel withdrew from southern Lebanon 
due to international pressure. However, this is incorrect, as the Director-General of the 
Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced as the withdrawal concluded this was a 
unilateral action due to a changing military environment:  
Yet, over time, the “Lebanese equation” has slowly changed. So much so, 
that a few months ago, the Israeli government decided to unilaterally 
withdraw from Lebanon, as a means of better promoting Israel’s security, 
in light of the new realities. And indeed, a full Israeli pull-out from 
Lebanon was completed Thursday, May 25th.266 
Besides the changing military calculation that was occurring,  Israel domestic 
opinion also felt that the sacrifices that the military was making in soldiers’ lives was not 
accomplishing the objectives that the military had set out to achieve, “Certainly, the 
momentum for getting out of Lebanon very much came from Israeli society, which was 
increasingly intolerant of Israeli losses.”267  Further evidence that international opinion 
was not a factor is illustrated when Israel than re-invaded Lebanon in 2006 after two of 
its soldiers were kidnapped, “In 2006, Hezbollah militants kidnapped two Israeli soldiers 
patrolling the border between Lebanon and Israel, provoking a month long war in which 
                                                 
264 Norton, “Hizballah and the Israeli Withdrawal from Southern Lebanon,” 22–35. 
265 Sosebee, “Possible Withdrawal From Lebanon Becomes Israeli Election Issue,” 9. 
266 Eytan Bentsur, “Op-ed Article on Israel’s Withdrawal from Lebanon,” Israel Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, May 25, 2000, http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Speeches+by+Israeli+leaders/2000/Op-
ed+Article+on+Israel-s+Withdrawal+from+Lebanon.htm. 
267 Norton, “Hizballah and the Israeli Withdrawal from Southern Lebanon,” 22–35. 
 90 
1,200 Lebanese, most of them civilians, and 128 Israelis, most of them soldiers, were 
killed.”268  This time, however, Israel had learned from the failure of its occupation and 
was involved in a quick war and withdrew back to its side of the border. While the 
success of the Second Lebanese War is debatable, it did accomplish an overall strategic 
objective of significantly reducing rocket attacks on Israel once the conflict had ended. 
So why did Israel withdraw from southern Lebanon? My thesis is that Israel 
withdrew because it had developed new capabilities that could counter the problems it 
confronted when trying to station troops outside of Israel while still accomplishing its 
military objectives.   These new options of increased intelligence capability and improved 
force projection meant that it no longer needed to have a large military footprint outside 
of its borders. As mentioned in the previous paragraph the Israel Minister of Foreign 
Affairs in 2000 talked about a change in the ‘Lebanese equation’ and ‘new realities’. One 
of these new intelligence capabilities was that Israel began a campaign of intercepting 
Hezbollah’s communications in order to discover how the organization worked. Nobody 
knows how many underground cables Israel has actually compromised but Hezbollah 
seems to unearth a different location every few months: 
Hezbollah has been characteristically reticent in describing how the 
existence and location of the tap on the fiber-optic cable near Zrarieh was 
determined… But it is likely the tap was discovered using similar means 
that led to the unearthing of previous Israeli interceptions near Srifa in 
December last year, and south of Houla in October 2009.269 
In addition to intercepting Hezbollah’s communications Israel is also augmenting 
its intelligence with unmanned aerial vehicles, “Israel’s drones, like those of a few 
foreign powers, have since evolved into a sophisticated fleet of long-range surveillance 
platforms that are ever-present over the Gaza Strip and southern Lebanon.”270  In fact, 
Israel has a thriving indigenous industry producing unmanned aerial vehicles for itself 
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and sale to other countries – one example would be the Heron.271  Israel has even 
advanced to the point where it has added lethal capabilities to its UAVs similar to the 
Predator and has utilized these drones to attack kill terrorists without having to send 
military forces into foreign territory, “Israeli airstrikes killed seven Palestinian members 
of Islamic Jihad’s armed wing in southern Gaza,”272  
Since 2000 Israel has also added significant defensive capabilities that allow it to 
accomplish its primary objective – the defense of northern Israel from rockets – without 
having to deploy soldiers outside of its border. How significant have these advances in 
defensive missile technology been? “Israeli defense and other analysts say it has now 
reached a level of maturity that could begin changing the nature of strategic decisions in 
the region.”273  Through research and development and steady improvements Israel has 
produced a wide variety of anti-rocket systems that are achieving results, “Israel is 
steadily assembling one of the world’s most advanced missile defense systems, a multi-
layered collection of weapons meant to guard against a variety of threats, including the 
shorter-range Grads used to strike Israeli towns like this one and intercontinental 
rockets.”274  With systems like the Arrow 2, David’s Sling, and the Iron Dome, Israel is 
now capable of intercepting most rockets fired from outside of its borders before they 
cause damage to any cities. For example the Iron Dome currently has, “a success rate of 
over 90%.”275  Israel has also developed new sensors to deploy along its border to detect 
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individuals trying to illegally enter276 and cyber systems that can prevent an enemy’s air 
defense system from finding Israeli aircraft involved in operations – such as the “Suter” 
airborne network attack system.277 
E. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, these three case studies have demonstrated why the concept of 
large overseas military bases is an outdated concept. The United States is closing bases 
and reducing personnel in South Korea as it seeks to accomplish more capabilities with 
less deployed personnel. North Korea and the United States have also both realized that 
the first battlefields of the next war will be in who controls space and cyberspace. Both 
states are therefore testing new capabilities and establishing cyber military units. Both 
states realize that by the time traditional troops, planes, and ships become involved in a 
conflict the important skirmishes deciding battle field dominance will have already been 
decided. In the past this would have been a location like a hill or the Fulda Gap, in the 
future it will be capabilities like GPS and Internet communications. 
In the Falkland Islands the British continue to station troops there because of 
British settler requests and not because the Falkland Islands have any military usefulness.   
The British military has decided that the best use of its resources is to turn the Falkland 
Islands into a military place with a minimal amount of personnel as opposed to a military 
base. The British military accomplished this by building RAF Mount Pleasant, improving 
its intelligence collection capabilities, and creating the capability to rapidly reinforce the 
island if it becomes necessary. 
The Israel case has shown the problems with trying to establish a military 
presence in unfriendly areas – especially when the military objectives are non-traditional 
and a state is facing an insurgency. The Israel military solved this problem by 
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withdrawing from southern Lebanon, increasing their intelligence capabilities, and 
utilizing new technology like the Iron Dome and unmanned vehicles to project force from 
within Israel and accomplish the same military objectives.   
One of the common threads that unite these three cases is that all three countries 
have decided that large foreign military bases are becoming an outdated concept. The 
development of new technology has allowed them to accomplish the same objectives 
without deploying military forces more effectively.   
As China continues to gain more economic and military power it will face choices 
about developing a string of pearls in the Indian Ocean. However, China is likely to 
realize that it can accomplish the same military objectives without having to station large 
military forces in overseas bases. Additionally, China does not have a legacy of overseas 
military obligations that will force it to deploy substantial forces overseas to protect its 
citizens or allies. 
 94 




Chapter V presents evidence that Chinese officials and military leaders talk about 
new military tech in ways that suggest the utility of overseas military bases is low, and 
that their public statements assert they do not want to establish overseas military bases for 
a variety of reasons. Chinese perceptions and intentions are assessed through an 
examination of writing and statements from both diplomatic and military leaders at the 
geo-strategic level. Next, this paper examines Chinese documents to illustrate how the 
revolution in military affairs has led China to expand the domain of warfare from land, 
sea, and air into the cyber realm and space. Chinese sources view these new realms as 
critical to future warfare and feel that conflicts will be decided by who is able to establish 
dominance in both of these areas. This reduces the impact that overseas military bases 
will play in a conflict. While overseas military bases could still play a part in the 
maritime realm, there are better ways to collect intelligence and project power. These 
better methods include cyber espionage, satellites, and mobile naval power projection 
like aircraft carriers and unmanned aerial vehicles. In a future conflict, overseas military 
bases provide an immovable object that is easy to target and isolate from the rest of the 
conflict. An overseas military base in Pakistan will not be useful in a conflict over 
Taiwan or a skirmish in the South China Sea, as opposed to an aircraft carrier that will 
have the option to be wherever the threat is greatest. 
Additionally, as China develops its cyber and space capabilities, Chinese military 
leaders are debating the strategy of how a future conflict would unfold. China is also 
developing UAVs to serve as a force multiplier in the maritime realm and reduce their 
requirements for ships and military personnel. The best evidence of this is their training 
with UAVs onboard PLAN naval vessels. These reduced requirements would result in 
fewer forces deployed, less logistical support, and the option to provide the same 
capabilities aboard naval vessels as opposed to on an overseas military base.  
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Finally, China is examining different blueprints on how to accomplish its 
logistical needs in the international arena. One of the plans that China is currently 
experimenting with is the concept of military places that have a minimal military 
presence and instead primarily serve as resupply points for naval vessels. 
B.  DEFINING CHINESE NATIONAL INTEREST AND MILITARY 
OBJECTIVES 
China’s national interests have shifted since the economic reforms in the 1970s. 
But what are China’s national interests?  Xu Qi, a senior captain in the People’s 
Liberation Army, published an article in China Military Science in 2004 examining some 
of these issues: “In terms of the key factors that constitute comprehensive national power, 
a nation’s territorial area, natural resources, population size, and [national] qualities are 
the most fundamental conditions.”278  Among key attributions listed are natural 
resources. Ever since 1993, China’s demand for oil has outstripped its domestic supply. 
Therefore, China has had to import oil to ensure that its economic growth can continue 
unrestrained. In the 19th and 20th centuries, many countries developed international 
military bases in order to protect oil imports and shipping lanes in an unstable 
international environment. Examples of states creating international bases for this reason 
include Great Britain, Japan, and the United States. However, in the 21st century, the 
international maritime scene is more stable, and for a variety of reasons. The most 
important is that the United States has served as the world’s policeman for the past 
twenty years, ensuring the relative free flow of goods in most of the maritime realm. 
Many other countries have ceded this responsibility to the United States because the 
United States claims to operate according to universal rules that apply to everybody—
including the United States. Another reason the maritime realm is more stable is the 
United Nations. While the United Nations has very limited force projection power, it is 
able to create a forum where countries can create theoretically impartial agreements and 
resolve understandings. Importantly, unlike the League of Nations, all the major regional 
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powers participate and claim to abide by the rules of the United Nations. The United 
Nations, therefore, raises the threshold for when disagreements will create conflict. A 
third important reason for maritime stability is that most countries in the world now 
subscribe to a market capitalist system. This agreement on economic fundamentals 
creates the opportunity for organizations like the World Trade Organization to create 
rules, judge disagreements, and punish violators, none of which was possible in the past. 
Finally, there is cooperation among states to punish non-state actors that decide to cheat 
the system. Examples of this include the Combined Maritime Task Force.279 
Energy security is not the only national interest that China has to think about. 
China is also worried about what it perceives as its national territory integrity, 
specifically Taiwan, the Parcel Islands, and the Spratly Islands, to name the three most 
important. All three of these territory issues are in dispute and China is concerned that 
any escalation in conflict could lead to disruption in its oil supply. This leads to a duality 
in Chinese foreign policy that many rising powers have faced. First, China gains from the 
current system and, hence, wants to maintain the stability of the system so it can continue 
to benefit economically. In the 2010 Chinese Defense White Paper, the Chinese 
government talks about peace and defense in relation to its military objectives as “an 
independent foreign policy of peace and a national defense policy that is defensive in 
nature.”280  China also wants to ensure that its rise does not result in other regional 
states balancing against it, and so China continues to deny it has any international 
territorial objectives: “China will never seek hegemony, nor will it adopt the approach of 
military expansion now or in the future, no matter how its economy develops.”281  This 
has been reinforced by various Chinese officials:  
In December 2010, State Councilor Dai Bingguo specifically cited Deng’s 
guidance, insisting China adhered to a “path of peaceful development” and 
would not seek expansion or hegemony. He asserted that the “bide and 
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hide” rhetoric was not a “smokescreen” employed while China builds its 
strength, but rather an admonition to be patient and not stand out.282 
At the same time that Chinese leaders do not want to disturb the current 
international system, they also recognize that their national interests have expanded. In 
the 19th or 20th centuries, if there was a dispute between countries over natural resources 
or territory, there were three primary options available to resolve the dispute. The first 
was diplomacy. The second was economic disruption through a blockade or increasing 
tariffs. Finally there was military force. Military force was limited in scope to ground, 
naval, and air forces. However, in the 21st century, additional military options have 
become available. President Hu addressed this point directly in his Historic Missions 
speech given to the Central Military Committee on December 24, 2004, 
The progress of the period and China’s development have caused our 
national security interests to gradually go beyond the scope of our 
territorial land, seas, and airspace, and continually expand and stretch into 
the oceans, space, and [cyberspace]. Maritime, space, and [cyberspace] 
security have already become important areas of [China’s] national 
security.283 
It is important to note that President Hu does not reference directly how to address 
national security interests in the oceans. While it is possible that China could establish 
overseas military bases, this would directly contradict fifty years of foreign policy 
statements. More importantly, if China began to establish overseas bases, it would likely 
accelerate a regional balancing against China by other Asian nations. Additionally, 
China’s national security interests in the maritime realm can be indirectly protected by 
developing its capabilities in space and cyber: 
In the informatized maritime warfare, the air and space information 
platform will become the “commanding height” of information support in 
war. The one that controls the “command height” is the one who can seize 
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information supremacy, which subsequently creates necessary conditions 
for the obtainment of air supremacy and maritime supremacy.284 
The added benefit of developing capabilities in space and cyber is it reduces the 
likelihood of regional balancing against China. Launching satellites and developing cyber 
units does not have the same aggressive military expansion connotations that establishing 
overseas military bases does. By developing cyber and space capabilities instead of 
overseas military bases, this give China the opportunity to both increase its military 
capabilities when dealing with international national security issues while minimizing 
balancing behavior by its regional neighbors.   
C. EXPANDING THE BATTLESPACE – THE CYBER DOMAIN 
1.  Chinese Doctrine and Training 
In the 20th century, overseas military bases were important because the primary 
battlefields were land, sea, and air. These were all objective physical spaces that were 
located in a fixed area. If a military wanted to control a strait, they needed to have 
military forces there to defend the waterway from other militaries. Similar for control of a 
hill or the control of the sky, military forces were required to be physically present to 
prevent someone else from occupying and denying the space to your country. However, 
Chinese military leaders, along with some other countries, have realized that the 
battlespace has expanded. One new battlespace is the information realm, or cyberspace. 
“In future warfare the traditional race to control the air and the sea will become 
contention for control of information.”285  Even China’s president has realized that in 
order for the PLA to compete they have to master this new objective. “Winning 
informatized regional wars is a completely new task that our military must face and 
handle.”286  Yet in 2004, Chairman Hu felt that the military still needed to make 
significant progress, noting, “Our military lacks practice in high-tech wars, particularly in 
                                                 
284 Fang, On Maritime Strategic Access, 65. 
285 Zhang Panxiong and Chen Yongshui, “New Trends in Future Warfare,” Jiefangjun Bao, Dec. 15, 
1998, quoted in David Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military (Berkeley: UC Press, 2004) 77. 
286 “JFJB Commentator on Spirit of CPC Fourth Plenum, Enlarged Meeting of CMC” Jiefangjun Bao, 
Dec. 17,  2004, Open Source Center CPP20041221000018. 
 100 
informatized wars.  Because of these problems, our minds and concepts are still bounded 
and influenced by traditional concepts in many fields.”287  To illustrate Chinese 
perceptions of this new battlespace this portion will be divided into cyber doctrine, cyber 
training, and cyber activities. 
Chinese military strategists over the past decade have developed a number of 
ideas concerning cyberspace. One of the most important strategic changes is the idea that 
in the event of a conflict it is important to strike first in cyberspace. This is a significant 
shift in doctrine from China’s normal policy of “active defense” where China would only 
attack someone if they had initiated the attack: 
Chinese belief that only countries that take the initiative in an information 
war or establish information superiority and control ahead of time will 
win, and that this requires reconnaissance and intelligence gathering 
before the first battle to set the stage for the use of cyber forces.288 
This cult of the offensive can be seen in Chinese journals. In an article titled 
“Bringing Internet Warfare into the Military System is of Equal Significance with Land, 
Sea, and Air Power” in Jiefangjun Bao, the authors’ state, “It is essential to have an all-
conquering offensive technology and to develop software and technology for [inter]net 
offensives, so as to be able to launch attacks and countermeasures on the [inter]net.”289  
 General Dai Qingman, head of the PLA General Staff Fourth Department shares 
similar sentiments, “As the key to gaining the initiative in operations lies in positively 
and actively contending with an enemy for information superiority, China should 
establish such a view for IO as ‘active offense.’”290  Other military journals have 
highlighted information warfare as an important new capability:  “Two military doctrinal 
writings, Science of Strategy, and Science of Campaigns identify information warfare 
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(IW) as integral to achieving information superiority and an effective means for 
countering a stronger foe.” 291  Along with the importance of information warfare is the 
shift in the center of gravity of a war. Instead of the center of gravity being an airfield or 
an aircraft carrier, as “the Science of Strategy explains, ‘In the information war, the 
command and control system is the heart of information collection, control, and 
application on the battlefield. It is also the nerve center of the entire battlefield.’”292 
The shift of the military objective during an engagement from stopping frontline 
military forces to disrupting the command center has significant strategic implications for 
maritime operations. “Future at-sea informationalized warfare has characteristics of 
noncontact and nonlinearity [and] in particular uses advanced informationalized weapons, 
space weapons, and new-concept weapons.”293  With this new concept of warfare, it is no 
longer vitally important to have military forces immediately engaged in a disputed area. 
The initial goal is no longer to be the first military unit to seize the disputed ground and 
retain control until reinforcements arrives. Instead, the primary goal in a future conflict is 
to disable and disrupt your adversary’s command and control. Once this has been 
accomplished, his deployed forces will be vulnerable to attack. This strategy is perfect for 
a country like China to use against an adversary that has a significantly stronger physical 
military. “Chinese analysts also describe computer network warfare as a critical tool that 
can be exploited by a weaker military force to level the playing field against a stronger 
opponent.”294 
The previous quotes illustrate how overseas military bases are no longer the 
primary focus of maritime naval competition. Instead some Chinese military thinkers 
have advocated that cyberspace and information control has surpassed the importance of 
physical forces stationed in the area. This is especially true for forces that are constrained 
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to a specific geographical location as opposed to military forces like aircraft carriers that 
are able to constantly be on the move. An appropriate analogy would be the invention of 
the aircraft carrier in World War II. Previous to World War II, naval forces had to locate 
the enemy and then engage each other via artillery on battleships. However, with the 
invention of the aircraft carrier and naval aviation, naval ships no longer had to see each 
other to engage in combat. This was demonstrated with the Battle of the Coral Sea. This 
revolution extended the distances that naval forces could engage and resulted in the 
battleship no longer being the most important force in a naval conflict. A similar change 
is occurring now. Only instead of aircraft carriers, it is now the control of information 
that will be the deciding factor in future naval engagements. Importantly, the battle for 
control of information will be able to take place further away from the contested area and 
can now occur from military positions in the home country. Again, this does not make 
overseas military bases useless, just as the aircraft carrier did not make the battleship 
useless. Instead it minimizes the importance of overseas military bases.    
A final example of the change in Chinese military doctrine involves the rewriting 
of training manuals. One of the best examples is the update to the “Outline of Military 
Training and Evaluation” that was published in 2008. This manual is important because it 
“is the guideline and the law for the entire military and [People’s] Armed Police Force to 
conduct and carry out the training.”295  Previously, the manual has been rewritten six 
different times since 1949, with the last revision being in 2001. The new manual focuses 
on “the strategic goals to build an informatized military and win informatized 
warfare.”296   
The strategic change in military doctrine concerning cyberspace has also 
translated into changes in military training. One of the most important changes has been 
networking all of China’s different military regions together so that commanders can 
have quicker access to what is happening on the battlefield or in any region of the 
country. While the wartime capabilities of the information superhighway are unknown, 
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the training capabilities were presented to reporters during a nationwide exercise in 2008, 
which was monitored from Beijing: 
The exercises over a 10,000 li [Chinese mile] range were reviewed all on 
the network. Various services and arms and the Armed Police Force 
demonstrated on the same stage and communicated with each other, which 
was the first time in our military’s history of collective training of training 
outlines. The reporter saw that the studio hall was connected with the 
training bases of various services and arms.297 
The next important change related to cyber was the creation of cyber units in the 
People’s Liberation Army. The first mention of these units was in 1999: ‘‘In November 
1999, a Jiefanguin Bao (Liberation Army Daily) article stated that China may develop an 
information warfare branch of service—a “net force”—to complement the army, navy, 
and air force.”298  Prior to 2009, the responsibilities for cyber units had been refined into 
two different departments: 
The Third Department of the PLA General Staff Department, which has 
traditionally engaged in signals intelligence collection, bears primary 
responsibility within the PLA for computer network exploitation… The 
Fourth Department of the PLA General Staff Department, which has 
traditionally engaged in electronic warfare, plays the leading role in 
computer network attack.299 
Other Chinese units, such as Project 863,300 were created to assist with espionage 
against the United States, while additional Chinese units were created to both create 
viruses and provide network defense for Chinese systems against computer network 
attacks.301 
Finally, Chinese units are conducting training to ensure that they are ready for 
conflict in cyberspace and how to respond accordingly: 
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In the exercise, troops of the defending PLA forces had to fend off attacks 
from mock aggressor forces employing simulated cyber and electronic 
attacks. These attacks included a computer virus that sowed confusion by 
changing logistics requirements, using electrical pulse attacks that 
destroyed computer motherboards, and jamming communications and 
radar systems.302 
2.  Chinese Cyber Operations – More Effective than Overseas Bases 
While there are plenty of Chinese articles on Chinese units preparing for defense 
against cyber attacks, there is a lack of Chinese reports on Chinese offensive cyber 
capabilities. This is not surprising, since most countries, including the United States, tend 
not to discuss their offensive cyber capabilities openly. The ability to identity that China 
was conducting cyber reconnaissance and attacks would help illustrate the point that 
China is utilizing the cyber realm to accomplish objectives that twenty years ago would 
have required military personnel on overseas bases. These objectives will reduce the fog 
of war by collecting intelligence and projecting force. Ten years ago, it would have been 
very difficult to attribute cyber reconnaissance, espionage, or attacks to any one country. 
However, over the last ten years, as cyberspace has evolved, attribution has become 
easier to accomplish. This is accomplished in four primary ways. The first way to identify 
a cyber incident is with the cyber signatures that are left behind through forensic analysis. 
A synonymous example would be how U.S. troops in Iraq were able to identify IED 
bomb makers due to the way they create their IEDs. IEDs might use a specific type of 
tape, use a certain type of cell phone, or be constructed in a similar fashion. Cyber attacks 
can be identified in similar ways. How did the individual gain access to the computer 
system, what type of virus or other malware did he use, how long did the attack take, 
etc.?  The specifics are classified but “This sometimes allows investigators to implicate 
the Chinese government directly, or sometimes even specific parts of the Chinese 
government, such as the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).”303 
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The second way to attribute a cyber attack is the type of information that was 
targeted. Was the attacker grabbing everything in sight? Or was he after a specific file or 
folder? “One can infer state involvement in some instances based on the specific 
targeting of government and defense networks.”304  Third, how difficult was the attack to 
accomplish?  Penetrating into the United States Department of Defense systems is not 
easy, and the more complex an attack was to accomplish, the less likely it was to be the 
work of criminal enterprises or other lone wolf attackers. If the attack was complicated 
and the items stolen had little to no monetary value, it further implicates a foreign 
government. Finally, an attacker’s identity can be discovered due to carelessness, for 
example, “when a high-ranking officer in China’s People’s Liberation Army employed 
the same server to communicate with his mistress that he was also using to coordinate an 
APT.”305  Due to a combination of these techniques, “The NSA and other intelligence 
agencies have made significant advances in attributing cyber attacks to specific sources—
mostly in China’s People’s Liberation Army—by combining cyber forensics with 
ongoing intelligence collection through electronic and human spying.”306   
So why would China conduct cyber reconnaissance?  The primary reason is due 
to the changing nature of intelligence collection. The primary way cyber reconnaissance 
is more effective than traditional reconnaissance is in monitoring strategic military 
deployments. One example of this would be an attempted cyber incident against the 
American air transportation system. “Government officials will not discuss the details of 
a recent attack on the air transportation network, other than to say the attack never 
directly affected air traffic control systems.”307  If an adversary could obtain access to a 
country’s air traffic system it would provide the state the ability to monitor strategic 
movement of both civilian and military planes. By detecting patterns in military plane 
movements, it would allow an adversary the ability to determine how an opponent was 
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deploying his forces before a conflict begins. Previously, this type of information would 
have required a radar station located relatively close to the area of interest. This radar 
station would have been able to pick up information of planes flying into and out of the 
area that the radar could monitor. Another way this could have been accomplished is with 
surveillance aircraft; however, these aircraft would also have required military bases 
close to the targets they were analyzing. However, the ability to gain access to the air 
transportation network of a country allows an opponent greater knowledge and range for 
civilian and military aircraft activity than was possible with overseas military bases. It is 
also important to note the scale of military mobility information available on the 
unclassified Internet: 
More than 90 percent of the Transportation Command’s distribution and 
deployment transactions are handled through unclassified commercial and 
Defense Department networks, the report found. The command is 
responsible for moving military equipment and personnel to war zones… 
Outside attempts to get into the command’s networks rose 30 percent in 
2011 compared with the previous year, General William Fraser, head of 
the command, told the Senate Armed Services Committee on Feb. 28.308 
There are also additional benefits to the cyber approach that are not available with 
traditional reconnaissance from overseas bases. One of these is the ability to destroy the 
integrity of the transportation system by denying, deleting, or changing important 
mobility information. “Mr. Brenner, the U.S. counterintelligence chief, issued a veiled 
warning about threats to air traffic in the context of Chinese infiltration of U.S. 
networks… He went on to warn of a potential situation where ‘a fighter pilot can’t trust 
his radar.’”309  With the upgrading of the air transportation network from a radar-based 
method to a GPS-based method, the problem is becoming even more critical.310 
Finally, the third way that cyber reconnaissance reduces traditional 
reconnaissance is in the tactical and operational battlefield. One U.S. government report 
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discusses the significant advances China has made over the last five years in its detection 
systems and their integration:  
Aircraft carrier strike groups operating in the vicinity of Taiwan and 
beyond are increasingly susceptible to detection by Chinese space-based 
electronic intelligence (ELINT) satellites, SIGINT collection, and land-
based over the horizon radar. The PLA is increasingly able to move data 
from these collection systems over secure fiber optic cable to commanders 
at multiple locations and echelons of command thanks to the military’s 
decade of work devoted to informationization.311 
Before cyber capabilities, this type of detailed information about the battlespace 
would not have been available, which created the need for overseas bases. If a country 
wanted to find an adversary aircraft carrier, a country would need to send out planes and 
ships to locate the opponent. Previous satellite imagery would not have been responsive 
enough to get current data. Additionally, before cyber networking, there would have been 
no way to quickly pass information like detailed imagery from the national to the tactical 
level in a real-time manner. Today with the increased observation capability and an 
integrated military network, overseas military bases might no longer be the first location 
to find an opponent’s mobile forces. 
Two specific examples conclude the section on cyberspace. The first example is a 
cyber attack that was labeled Night Dragon by McAfee:  
Starting in November 2009, coordinated covert and targeted cyber attacks 
have been conducted against global oil, energy, and petrochemical 
companies…McAfee has determined that all of the identified data 
exfiltration activity occurred from Beijing-based IP addresses and 





p.m. Beijing time, which also suggests that the involved individuals were 
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“company men” working on a regular job, rather than freelance or 
unprofessional hackers.312 
This example shows how a cyber attack could accomplish a military objective by 
preventing a conflict from occurring. Energy security is one of the Chinese government’s 
primary international objectives. Traditionally, if China were limited in its knowledge of 
oil locations or technology, it would be forced onto the international marketplace to 
import the oil that its economy needs. If no oil were available on the international 
marketplace, China would then look to disputed maritime areas to increase its domestic 
supply. This can be seen in the various territorial disputes in the Spratly islands and 
disputes with Japan. An historical example would be the Japanese decision to declare war 
on the United States during World War II. However, if China can steal advanced drilling 
technology, it gives China the ability to open up new domestic drilling options that were 
not available. Likewise, if China can obtain intelligence on where new sources of oil have 
been discovered, it can give China an advantage in the international marketplace. “By the 
time the FBI informed the company of suspicious network traffic in the summer of 2010, 
Chinese firms had outbid the oil company on several high-stakes acquisitions by just a 
few thousand dollars.”313  Thus, cyber espionage allows the Chinese government to 
increase its access to oil without having to result to territorial expansion or military 
conflict. By limiting the potential for military conflict, it minimizes the need for China to 
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The second specific example illustrating China’s cyber offensive capability was 
accidentally shown on a CCTV program in 2011: 
The screenshots appear as B-roll footage in the documentary for six 
seconds—between 11:04 and 11:10 minutes—showing custom-built 
Chinese software apparently launching a cyber-attack against the main 
website of the Falun Gong spiritual practice, by using a compromised IP 
address belonging to a United States university.314 
 
Figure 9.   CCTV Documentary315 
This example provides some of the most conclusive evidence that China is 
involved in developing offensive cyber tools.    
This section has illustrated how Chinese perceptions of cyberspace can help them 
accomplish objectives that previously could have been accomplished only by traditional 
reconnaissance and force projection. By shifting to a strategy of disrupting an opponent’s 
command and control at the beginning of a conflict, it minimizes the priority of having 
military forces at the scene of a conflict. This is especially true because, as long as the 
Chinese mainland is not affected, China can wait for its cyber capabilities to have their 
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desired impact of creating confusion and then attack at a time of their choosing. This idea 
couples nicely with the idea that a threat to China decreases with distance.” Oftentimes, 
threats to a nation’s interests—particularly its security interests— increase as their spatial 
distances decrease.”316   
This raises a secondary question: How will China discover who are the enemy 
forces that affect its national security?  Traditionally, this would have been accomplished 
with increasing military forces patrolling an increasing amount of maritime territory 
corresponding to an increase in Chinese objectives. These military forces would require 
military bases to assist with intelligence collection, force projection, and logistics. 
However, the following sections will show how satellites and unmanned vehicles have 
reduced the need for a significant amount of forward reconnaissance forces.  
D. EXPANDING THE BATTLEFIELD: SPACE – THE NEW “HIGH 
GROUND”  
In order for a Chinese stratagem to be successful, military leaders need as much 
intelligence as possible. In fact, Chinese leaders have identified space and the 
reconnaissance capabilities that it provides as strategically important to its military 
operations: 
[Space] has become China’s strategic interest and new “high ground.” At 
the same time, it also demonstrates that our satellite communications, 
global positioning, and radar information and transmission systems, etc., 
have obtained prominent success. [This] is beneficial for enhancing the 
information strength to safeguard our sea power.317 
 Over the last twenty years, China’s perceptions involving space have evolved to 
where they consider it a strategic interest in national security. This relates to the idea of 
expanding the realm of war from sea, air, and land into new domains. Space is one of 
those domains. Previous to the RMA, success on the battlefield was determined by the 
quality of your commander, the number of troops, the type of equipment, terrain, and 
tactics. However, since the RMA the battlefield has expanded so that along with cyber, 
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space is another important domain that will determine the outcome of a battle before the 
first shot has been fired. This can be illustrated in China’s actions to catch up to the 
United States in space while at the same time developing capabilities to prevent the 
United States from utilizing space in the event that hostilities develop.   
 Space is also significant because it can have a large impact on the other domains 
of land, sea, and air. “Space warfare has a profound influence on naval warfare…Space 
weapons can not only strike the enemy’s satellites in space [but] can also attack any 
terrestrial target from space. They have a tremendous influence on land and sea 
warfare.”318  This is especially true concerning immovable objects like overseas military 
bases. With satellite imagery, China and other countries will already know the layout of 
any overseas military base, including where the aircraft hangers are and where the 
headquarters building is located. In the event of a conflict, these locations are not able to 
move to disrupt ballistic missile attacks. However, with mobile forces like an aircraft 
carrier, states are able to introduce additional targeting complications into any future 
military conflict. Hence, if China were deciding what was more survivable in a future 
military conflict, movable capabilities like aircraft carriers present a better option than 
immovable capabilities like large overseas military bases. 
 Chinese leaders began to understand the importance of space after observing the 
United States during the first Gulf War and Bosnia during the 1990s. “The extensive use 
of satellites and space-based sensors, coordinated from North America, but with 
downlinks to forces in the field, exposed the PLA’s critical weaknesses in these areas.”319  
The importance of this capability was reinforced upon the Chinese after Operation Iraqi 
Freedom. “In 2001, the U.S. had a hundred military satellites and 150 commercial 
satellites in space, which constituted nearly half the world’s satellites. During the Iraq 
War in 2003, the U.S. used over fifty satellites to support battle operations.”320 
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As China attempted to catch up with the United States it began by utilizing 
commercial satellite imagery as it developed its own systems.321  However, over the past 
decade, China has rapidly improved its space capabilities. “China is now among the top 
few space powers in the world.”322 
Chinese sources describe China’s developing imagery capabilities including the 
recent launch of a satellite that can produce three-dimensional imagery. “The images’ 
resolution is 2.1 meters… The satellite can transmit data at a speed four to five times of 
previous satellites. And for the first time, a low-Earth-orbit remote-sensing satellite’s 
lifespan is now five years.”323  One of the objectives of developing its own satellite 
industry is so that China will no longer have to rely as extensively on commercial 
satellite capability. “Officials said this satellite will eliminate the country’s surveying and 
mapping industries’ dependence on foreign satellites for high-resolution images.”324   
 Along with imagery satellites, China is also taking advantage of other 
opportunities. One of these is space’s ability to quickly transmit information from 
different locations. “The first data relay satellite, the Tianlian I-01, was launched in April 
2008, and the second was launched in July 2011.”325  However, these space systems are 
about more than feeding raw information to commanders; they can also provide direct 
support to naval forces.326  This increased data capability allows smaller naval forces to 
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have more information than prior to the revolution in military affairs. With increased 
information, deployed naval forces need less reconnaissance aircraft or ships and can 
focus on force projection. Additionally, by knowing more about the operational 
environment, naval ships do not have to carry as many forces because they have a better 
idea of what type of threat they will face.   
Again the idea is that control of space will be a significant factor in determining 
who will win a future conflict. If China can seize the high ground in space, Chinese 
perceptions are that space will serve as a force multiplier in any conflict. This force 
multiplier is more important than additional overseas military bases. Space can serve as a 
force multiplier for naval forces that can be equipped with smaller forces that still can 
accomplish the same missions that would have required larger forces and the presence of 
an overseas military base. Traditionally, overseas military bases provided intelligence and 
force projection capabilities. However, space and satellites can now provide these 
capabilities for a larger area with fewer assets. For example, in one article talking about 
military operations, the role of satellites was highlighted: “In the several most recent local 
wars, 90 percent or more of the battlefield intelligence came from the satellite 
reconnaissance.”327    As an added bonus, satellites are also a lot more difficult to destroy 
than overseas military bases. Hence, compared to space, overseas military bases are less 
efficient and more vulnerable.  
However, having satellites is only part of the equation. The other aspect that the 
Chinese are focused on is denying an adversary the capability to utilize space in a future 
conflict. The Chinese have developed and demonstrated capabilities to achieve this. The 
most discussed was the Chinese test of an anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon.  “On January 
11, 2007, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) conducted its first successful direct-
ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons test in destroying one of its own satellites in 
space.”328  When some Chinese officials were asked about the ASAT test they pointed 
out that developing anti-satellite weapons was important to “counter perceived U.S. 
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‘hegemony’ in space and target the vulnerability of U.S. dependence on satellites.”329  
Indeed, in one PRC Daily article, the author is concerned that an operational Chinese 
Beiduo system will result in a first strike in space by the United States in the event of 
hostiles: 
Once China’s anti-aircraft carrier ballistic missile technology matures, the 
U.S. Navy will face a choice, do they lose an aircraft carrier to China’s 
first strike, or will they be forced to use anti-satellite weapons to shoot 
down China’s satellite, and from this, what space force action escalated by 
China might they face?330 
The Chinese are also pursuing other counter-space capabilities. “By September 
2006, China had used a ground-based laser to illuminate a U.S. satellite in several tests of 
a system to ‘blind’ satellites.”331  China is also working on other systems to jam satellites, 
or degrade or destroy them with lasers or high-powered microwaves.332 
So what does this all mean?  The Chinese military feel that the weaponization of 
space is not a question of if but when. “A Senior Colonel of the PLA’s Academy of 
Military Sciences said that ‘outer space is going to be weaponized in our lifetime.’”333  
According to Chinese new sources, “While opposing the weaponization of outer space, 
the Chinese military is also making the necessary preparations.”334  The Chinese 
perception is that they do not want a war in space, but in the event of a conflict they do 
not want to be caught unprepared. China feels that, similar to the cyber realm, space will 
be one of the first domains contested in the event of a conflict. This means that even 
before the first shot is fired, whoever controls space and cyber will have a significant 
advantage in an ensuing conflict. In fact, by being able to deny an adversary access to 
these two domains, China might be able to prevent a conflict from occurring. This further 
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illustrates why China would not be interested in building large overseas military bases. 
One assessment is that by the time forces in an overseas military base could be utilized in 
a future conflict, the conflict would already have been decided in the space and cyber 
domain. Military forces stationed on the periphery or other international areas would then 
be cut off from all communications with their command and be blind to the world around 
them. This would then allow the Chinese to either not engage them or decide to attack 
them at a time of their choice. This would be similar to the island-hopping campaign 
from World War II that the Allies decided to use in order to defeat Japan in the Pacific. 
Once the Allies had gained naval superiority and significantly disrupted Japanese forces, 
they no longer needed to secure every island witb a Japanese military base. Instead, they 
could just bypass these and concentrate on important objectives. A similar situation could 
occur in the Pacific today. With no access to GPS, Internet, satellite phones, or 
international communications, how effective would Anderson AFB in Guam be to a 
skirmish in the South China Sea?  In fact, cyber might be more important than space 
since, “in recent years, two U.S. government satellites have experienced interference 
apparently consistent with the cyber exploitation of their control facility.”335 
E. UNMANNED VEHICLES – A FORCE PROJECTION MULTIPLIER 
In the event of a future war, Chinese military leaders expect that the space and 
cyber domain will be two of the first domains that will be contested. Another strategic 
change that China is making is incorporating unmanned aerial vehicles into all levels of 
military units.  
China has become very interested in UAVs after seeing what the United States 
has accomplished over the last decade. “UAVs also are beginning to fill scientific 
discussions in Chinese military technical journals. A glance at October’s Fire Control & 
Command Control reveals two articles’ titles that display Chinese technological prowess 
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with respect to communications and guidance for UAVs.”336  Along with military 
technical journals, the Chinese media is also highlighting UAVs in order to interest the 
public and stimulate domestic creativity and production: 
On January 11, CCTV’s “Military Report” (junshi baodao) program 
reported on the X-47B’s carrier application and included pictures of it 
with its wings bent for storage. These publications manifest a growing and 
progressing Chinese awareness of UAV capabilities and their relevant 
naval applications.337 
Due to the recent developments in UAVs and their quick advancement, China 
feels that it still has time to achieve parity in the unmanned vehicle realm. China has thus 
encouraged its domestic aeronautical manufactures to start producing domestic UAVs for 
both civilian and military use,   
The “Wings of Crack Troops—Chinese UAV Conference and 
Exhibition,” which is held once every two years, started in Beijing. More 
than 70 domestic and foreign scientific research institutes and companies 
displayed more than 60 complete UAVs and related technical products.. 
Here, several models of UAVs with the capabilities of vertical takeoff and 
landing attracted the most attention.338 
Along with conferences and conceptual development, UAVs are making a 
significant impact on the capabilities of the Chinese military at all levels. Starting at the 
tactical level, these UAVs serve as a force multiplier allowing one solider to accomplish 
significantly more reconnaissance than he could have even ten years ago. In an article in 
June 2012, a PLA reconnaissance squad leader talked about the dramatic changes in his 
unit: 
Nine years ago, he could only spy on the enemy along the frontline 
equipped with only a pair of binoculars and his skills in hand-to-hand 
combat. But now, he is operating a new kind of unmanned aerial vehicles. 
With the use of a mouse and a keyboard, he can see quite clearly enemy 
positions over on the other side… As more and more new computerized 
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equipment is being supplied to his company, they are now equipped with 
UAVs, a scout vehicle fleet and radar instead of optical instruments such 
as binoculars to help them spy on the enemy. They have now replaced 
“armed” reconnaissance with more technical and intelligent spying 
techniques.339 
This increase in reconnaissance ability for all soldiers has led to a dramatic 
change in their capability. Where ten years ago a reconnaissance squadron was limited to 
their binoculars and transportation vehicles, it can now utilize the air and optical cameras 
to scout a larger area in a shorter amount of time. This cuts down on the amount of 
reconnaissance squadrons necessary to be developed at the perimeters of a country or 
overseas. One squadron in the Spratly Islands can now accomplish the equivalent of what 
would have taken multiple squadrons to survey. 
However, it is not just reconnaissance that the Chinese military is using its UAVs 
to accomplish. The Chinese have also incorporated UAVs into their “Blue Force,” which 
they use to help train Chinese forces in modern warfare: 
More than 10 Blue Force unmanned aerial vehicles were airborne all at 
once and fell in formation. They skirted the air defense fire of the Red 
force and “destroyed” their command network. In just 20 minutes, the 
fleet of tanks rolling majestically on suddenly became “blind” and “deaf.” 
They had to be taken out of the battlefield.340 
Thus, along with reconnaissance, the Chinese military is also incorporating UAVs 
into tactical and operational training. The ability to take out a command center and 
cripple advancing tanks is another task that ten years ago would have taken either air 
support with manned air craft or another tank force. Today it can be accomplished with a 
smaller force employing UAVs. By accomplishing the same objectives with fewer forces, 
it reduces the need to establish large, overseas military bases. The logistical requirements 
for smaller forces are significantly less than what would normally be required to 
accomplish the same objectives. With fewer forces, it also results in less support 
personnel and equipment. By minimizing the support personnel and equipment, it reduces 
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the amount of food, water, and petroleum required to conduct missions. This reduction 
could have two beneficial outcomes. The first outcome is that fewer overseas places or 
bases are required because maritime vessels can deploy for longer periods of time 
without resupply. Additionally, maritime vessels are able to obtain intelligence and force 
projection support from longer distances than was previous possible. The second positive 
outcome is that with the reduced footprint, some of these capabilities might be able to be 
deployed within a ship instead of on land. For example, previously, if a naval ship that 
was not an aircraft carrier wanted to have an aerial intelligence-gathering capability, its 
options were limited. Today, that same naval ship has the opportunity to deploy with 
unmanned aerial vehicles, which reduces its need for land-based aerial intelligence 
gathering. This then reduces the need for overseas bases. 
 Chinese forces are also starting to incorporate UAVs onto their naval platforms. 
This began with conferences and competitions that focused on utilizing UAVs on aircraft 
carriers341 to press in military magazines. “Last July, Modern Ships magazine, a ten-page, 
special section discussed carrier-based UAVs in detail.”342  In April 2012, a Japanese P-3 
photographed a Chinese naval ship operating a UAV far from shore.343  
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Figure 10.   Chinese Naval UAV344 
China continues to conduct research to make UAVs take over a variety of roles 
and increasing capabilities. A recent Chinese article was titled “Study of Capability of 
Shipborne UAV Transmitting Ship Damage Information.”345  Looking at the strategic 
level, China is developing UAVs similar to the Global Hawk called the Xianglong346 and 
BZK-005.347  The goal of these strategic systems is to increase the amount of intelligence 
that the Chinese military is able to collect off of their shoreline and around their ships.   
By utilizing UAVs, China can save on manpower while being more efficient in 
collection. It also allows the Chinese government to continue to expand their military 
capabilities while minimizing the number of ships they have to deploy far from China or 
build overseas military bases. Thus, these UAV capabilities help China continue to honor 
their commitment to not build overseas bases while at the same time develop additional 
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capabilities. Additionally, efforts to arm China’s UAV would mean that in the event of a 
conflict, there would be fewer Chinese targets in international waters where the United 
States currently holds local superiority. 
F. LOGISTICS – RESUPPLY POINTS, NOT BASES 
 With smaller naval forces accomplishing the same tasks, less logistical support is 
required to sustain these forces when they are far from China. This reduced logistical 
need can then result in smaller and less frequent logistical resupply, which can be 
accomplished by agreements with other countries that host resupply points, as opposed to 
military bases.  
 As China has begun to participate in anti-piracy operations and goodwill naval 
tours, it has started a discussion about the best way to keep these naval forces resupplied 
when they are away from China. Originally, Chinese naval vessels would be 
accompanied by resupply vessels, but the limitations of this strategy soon became 
apparent with the prolonged deployments in the Gulf of Aden.348  Since then, the Chinese 
Navy has shifted to an idea that its logistical resupply can then be handled by foreign 
country “places” as opposed to large overseas military bases. The difference between 
places and bases is explained by Project 2049, a foreign affairs think tank. When 
discussing the future of Gwadar, “the seaport could theoretically be used by Chinese 
naval vessels, but there is a meaningful distinction between a friendly ‘place’ willing to 
provide maintenance, resupply or logistical support to a Chinese ship and a military base 
capable of supporting combat operations.”349  Another example of China looking for 
places as opposed to bases is its recent discussions with the Seychelles concerning 
resupply operations. “Under the proposal, Chinese naval ships would regularly visit ports 
in the Seychelles to collect supplies, and allow their crews to rest, but they wouldn’t be 
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permanently based there.”350  Two final examples of China employing the places-not-
bases philosophy is with their port visits to resupply their vessels that are currently 
working with the anti-piracy task force off of Somalia. China Daily ran an editorial in 
August 2009 discussing the need for Chinese ships to establish port visits to ensure the 
success of future anti-piracy efforts. “Past anti-piracy experience in the Gulf area also 
indicates that China’s navy should make bigger efforts to further shorten its material and 
armament supply cycle to guarantee its success, and, if necessary, set up some coastal 
refuel and maintenance stations.”351  Shortly after this, the PLAN began to make port 
visits first to Salalah, Oman and then to Djibouti. In order to avoid turning these locations 
into bases, the Chinese have also looked to Chinese commercial companies to deal with 
logistical issues of working with the host country and obtaining supplies.352  
These places do not represent a string of pearls for a number of reasons. First, the 
main focus is resupply and not military force projection. Second, the places will not have 
any permanent military facilities or military ships or planes stationed at them. Third, even 
if the Chinese were to turn the Seychelles, Gwadar, or another place into a military base, 
it would be significantly vulnerable in the event of hostilities breaking out with India or 
the United States. RADM McDevitt makes this point when discussing the lessons China 
has probably learned from its anti-piracy task force operations: “Operating alone in 
waters where the air space is dominated by the either the United States or India must have 
emphasized the importance of air cover for distant operations that could someday involve 
combat.”353  Fourth, if China were to station significant forces in the Seychelles, it would 
make them unavailable in the short term if a conflict were to break out in the South China 
Sea or Taiwan, assuming they would be let back through the Strait of Malacca in the 
event of hostilities. Finally, some Chinese experts expect that in the case of a conflict, 
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China will rely extensively on its submarine and land-based air forces while China’s 
surface ships play a supporting role within the first island chain: 
But for the PLA Navy, it is the submarine force and land-based naval 
aviation arm are the central players in area denial scenarios. The PLA 
Navy’s surface force plays second fiddle in these scenario’s and should a 
conflict over Taiwan erupt, will probably remain inside the first island 
chain, conducting anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and air-defense roles.354 
In conclusion, at the present time, it appears that the Chinese military leadership 
is examining how effective resupply points in other countries are to achieving its 
objectives. This approach appears to have had mixed results with limited success in 
places like Salalah and Djibouti, but problems in areas like Gwadar. Expect China to 
continue to experiment with this approach and further discuss if this arrangement can 
accomplish all their objectives or if another approach is warranted.  
G. CONCLUSION 
 In conclusion, by examining Chinese perspectives and actions, it does not appear 
that China perceives an overriding logic or compelling demand to build overseas military 
bases. Instead, Chinese strategic thoughts center on avoiding conflict. However, if 
conflict does occur, China wants to ensure that the factors are in its favor. Previously this 
would have been accomplished by projecting significant amounts of force at strategic 
trading points and on China’s periphery. However, as the quotes above from Chinese 
military-affiliated sources make clear, the battlefield has expanded and changed. Chinese 
military perspective now sees space and the cyber domain as the two most critical 
warfighting realms. In the event of a future conflict, whoever controls space and cyber 
will have a decisive advantage in the maritime realm. By implication, then, the 
effectiveness of overseas military bases will be minimized before the conflict has even 
begun. Additionally, the Chinese military is developing UAVs to keep their overseas 
footprint small, and reduce the amount of targets that the United States will be able to 
engage in the international arena and far from Chinese shores.  
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The goal of this research was to provide evidence and a theory about why China 
would not be interested in building a “string of pearls” in the Indian Ocean. To 
accomplish this objective, this thesis examined the military reasons for creating large, 
overseas military bases as offered by various important scholars in the field. The three 
reasons that stand out for establishing and maintaining a large, overseas military base 
were: intelligence, force projection, and logistics. However, with the revolution in 
military affairs collecting intelligence and force projection can be accomplished in more 
efficient methods. Logistics can now be outsourced to a host country to provide support 
for naval vessels that require resupply in a “places not bases” type of agreement.   
Chapter II initially examined the conventional wisdom surrounding the idea of 
Chinese military expansionism and creating overseas military bases. Two primary 
reasons for Chinese military expansion were then identified. The first reason offered was 
that China is operating according to the Mahan force projection model and so requires 
military forces to support and defend its sea lines of transportation. According to this 
theory, since China has to import massive amount of energy supplies from the Middle 
East and across the Indian Ocean, China will want to establish bases to protect its 
maritime trade. However, various problems were identified with this reason. The first 
problem is that there are many different lessons that can be drawn from the writings of 
Mahan. Examining the Chinese military and academic literature shows that there is no 
consensus about what lessons to learn from Mahan or whether Mahan is still relevant in 
the 21st century. The second problem with this conventional wisdom is that it minimizes 
the complications and cost associated with establishing multiple large military bases far 
away from the Chinese coast.   
The second conventional wisdom reason for Chinese military expansionism was 
that China is seeking to become a “great power.”  In order to become a great power, 
China feels it needs to emulate other important powers and attain the same attributes that 
these countries have. When China looks at other countries, it sees that they have aircraft 
carriers, overseas military bases, and maritime power-projection capabilities. Hence, 
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China seeks to attain these same attributes and will want to create overseas military bases 
as a source of national pride. However, there are also problems with this conclusion. 
First, overseas military bases might be an outdated concept that no longer has the same 
symbolism it did in the 20th century. Second, there are other ways to illustrate power, 
such as technological innovation. Third, if China were to begin to develop overseas 
military bases, it could lead to balancing behavior by other nations against China and 
complicate China’s international relations. 
Chapter III examined the Revolution in Military Affairs and how it has the 
potential to change the nature of warfare. This chapter examined four areas of 
technological innovation: space, open source intelligence, unmanned vehicles, and cyber. 
This chapter presented the theory that these four new technologies can accomplish the 
same military objectives of intelligence collection and force projection that were 
previously accomplished by overseas military bases. In fact, these four new technological 
innovations can accomplish these two objectives more efficiently and for a smaller cost. 
Chapter III framed overseas military bases as a form of meta-technology that is 
becoming outdated. In the 20th century, overseas military bases allowed technology like 
manned aircraft and naval vessels to extend their limited intelligence collection 
capabilities and force projection far beyond the coast of a country. However, with 
satellites, open source intelligence, unmanned vehicles, and cyber, intelligence collection 
and limited force projection can now be accomplished from a much farther range that 
stretches back to the host state. Essentially, these technologies have expanded the 
battlefield to an extent that each state can now be targeted in the event of a conflict before 
the first plane is launched or the first ship fires its weapons. 
Chapter IV examined three case studies to illustrate how the Revolution in 
Military Affairs has effected states actions regarding overseas military bases. The first 
case study examined the United States actions regarding its troops and bases in South 
Korea. The conclusion was that the United States is reducing its troops and bases in 
South Korea because new technology has allowed the United States to accomplish the 
same military objectives with fewer forces. The second case study was Britain and the 
Falkland Islands. Since 1982, the British are no longer interested in the Falklands for 
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their military usefulness but instead to protect its citizens located on the island. Britain is 
also able to reduce its military forces on the island due to better intelligence gathering 
and new technology. The third case is Israel’s decision to withdraw from southern 
Lebanon in 2000. Israel withdrew because they invented new technology that allowed 
them to accomplish the same military objective of securing their northern border without 
having to station troops in a neighboring county. 
Chapter V examined Chinese perceptions regarding the Revolution in Military 
Affairs. This chapter presented evidence that Chinese officials and military leaders talk 
about new military tech in ways that suggest the utility of overseas military bases is low, 
and that their public statements assert they do not want such to establish overseas military 
bases for a variety of reasons. Additionally, the Chinese military has been investing 
substantial resources in the areas of space, cyber, and unmanned vehicles. 
In conclusion, given what this research offers, what are some assessments for the 
future of Chinese maritime activities?  First, China could probably continue to invest in 
space, cyber, and unmanned vehicles. This could result in increasing amount of Chinese 
satellites in orbit, along with the development of micro-satellites and anti-satellite 
capabilities. The objective would be to reach parity with the United States or another 
country in the event of a conflict while at the same time degrading the capability of an 
opponent’s space systems. Possible evidence of this trend is China’s increase in satellites 
and its development of an indigenous navigation system similar to GPS. In cyber, China 
could continue to develop cyber units and cyber offensive and defensive capabilities to be 
used in both intelligence collection and force projection. Possible evidence of this is the 
establishment of a Chinese cyber “information security base,” and adding cyber as a 
possible new realm of warfare along with land, sea, and air. In unmanned vehicles, China 
could continue to research and develop air, land, and naval unmanned vehicles to 
increase its maritime reach while minimizing its overseas military presence. Possible 
evidence of this includes Chinese naval forces testing unmanned aerial vehicles from 
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naval vessels and the announcement by the People’s Daily that China’s State Oceanic 
Administration will replace its manned aircraft with unmanned aerial vehicles.355  
Second, these new technologies could lead to new military strategies concerning 
intelligence collection and force deployment. China could develop intelligence collection 
and force projection capabilities that can be accomplished from within China but affect 
an adversary country through space or cyber methods. This could result in new military 
strategies that focus on cyber and space as the first contested realms of warfare, with 
traditional kinetic attacks being relegated to later stages of a conflict. Finally, if this thesis 
is accurate, Chinese military maritime forces could continue to develop overseas places 
in foreign countries that can be used as logistics hubs, but would refrain from developing 
any large, overseas military bases.  
The question arises: If China and an opponent have reached technological parity, 
do all of these advances really change anything?  Yes, because the advance of technology 
creates new strategies and results in new capabilities being developed and deployed on 
the battlefield. Looking back at the history of warfare, advances in technology are 
normally quickly copied by opponents, resulting in a new status quo ante. However, even 
though both sides now have access to the same technology, the winners in future conflicts 
are the ones that find new strategies and develop new capabilities to harness the 
technology. World War I and World War II serve as good examples. At the beginning of 
World War I, the machine gun became an important tool that led to the development of 
trench warfare. At this point, each side had access to similar technology. Yet military 
technology development continued in order to find a way to defeat trenches and the 
machine gun. This culminated in new technology designed to defeat the machine gun, 
such as chemical weapons and early versions of the tank. It is important to note that the 
establishment of a new technological status quo it did not result in older weapons 
becoming useful again. Both sides gained machines guns, but nobody decided to go back 
to cavalry. 
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 World War II demonstrates a similar concept. At the beginning of the war, Japan 
had the superior aircraft with the Zero. However, the American military strove to develop 
a better aircraft. At a certain point in the war, both sides reached a new status quo 
concerning naval aviation and aircraft carriers. Yet the Americans were able to create a 
better plane that could outperform the Japanese Zero and were able to start winning the 
air war in the Pacific. In this example, it is important to note that both sides developed 
comparable fighters, but the winning side continued to improve on the fighter design 
while it developed new strategies and tactics that allowed it to be victorious. Similar to 
the World War I example, with the new aviation capability, aircraft carriers became the 
center of naval combat and the battleship began to play a supporting role.   
 This thesis argues that a similar transition is happening concerning new 
technology like cyber, space, and unmanned vehicles with the older “technology” being 
large, overseas military bases. While it is very likely that a new status quo will be reached 
in the realms of cyber, space, and unmanned vehicles, it is also possible that these new 
technologies will make large overseas bases less effective in a way that the aircraft carrier 
made battleships less effective. The winning side in the next war or skirmish will be the 
side that makes more improvement in these new technological areas, or develops better 
strategies or capabilities. Either way, according to this logic, large overseas military bases 
are reduced to secondary roles.   
 This revolution in military affairs has also led to a shift in the importance of 
strategic geography. Previous to the RMA, force projection was limited in its capability. 
If a country wanted to attack the United States, it needed to have a military base close 
enough to the United States to launch airplanes or a naval base to defend naval ships. The 
exception to this was nuclear weapons. If a country wanted to make sure it could attack 
any adversaries, it was important to maintain these military bases at all times. 
Additionally, these military bases had to have significant defenses because they would 
likely be the first location to be attacked in a conflict.   
 Today, the strategic calculus has changed. If a country wants to attack the United 
States, it no longer needs a military base close to the United States. A good example of 
this is Stuxnet and cyber skirmishes. Previously, if Israel wanted to attack a nuclear 
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facility in a foreign country, it would need to send in military aircraft to bomb the facility. 
Now it has a new option that does not require it to use traditional military methods, and it 
can be launched from anywhere—including inside Israel. With weapons of war now 
directly effective from a home country, it reduces the need of military bases to project 
this power or gain intelligence.  
 So what are the implications for the United States?  One implication is that the 
importance of overseas bases for both the United States and China should be constantly 
reevaluated. Unlike in the past, the United States can no longer automatically assume that 
overseas military bases will be functional at the start of the conflict. Previously this was 
only a concern with overseas military bases located close to adversary countries, such as 
those in South Korea or Japan. It was assumed that overseas military bases located far 
from adversary countries would have minimal concerns at the beginning of a conflict. 
However, with recent developments in cyber, space, and unmanned vehicles, this might 
no longer be the case.   
 In the future, instead of developing overseas military bases, a country like China 
could continue to refine a new strategy of war. This new strategy could focus on 
information attacks that attempt to cripple and isolate United States overseas military 
bases from a larger conflict. Hence, United States overseas military bases might have to 
be prepared to operate independently with little to no coordination with higher 
headquarters before a conflict officially begins. This possibility could require the United 
States to develop new strategies to secure the cyber realm and space realm, starting from 
a defensive perimeter and working outward in the case of a future conflict. Another 
concern would be the capabilities of future UAVs to conduct strategic offensive 
operations against bases that have traditionally been viewed as being far enough away 
from a conflict zone to not have to worry about an airborne attack. 
 The implications for how we evaluate Chinese activities abroad is that the United 
States should expand the realm of possibilities that China could take to achieve its 
international goals. While there is a possibility that China could develop overseas 
military bases in the Indian Ocean, it should not be the default assumed position. Instead, 
the United States should observe to see if China is pursing “places” instead of bases. 
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These places would not involve large military developments, but instead would be 
focused on resupply activities. Thus, if China were to sign an agreement with a country 
like the Seychelles, it is important to see what the agreement authorizes. As China 
becomes more involved in the Indian Ocean, it will be important to evaluate whether 
China decides to change positions on overseas bases. By monitoring Chinese maritime 
activities, the default position should be that China is establishing resupply points. If 
future evidence points to more substantial development than required for a resupply 
point, questions about China creating overseas military bases should be raised. 
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